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In this dissertation, I analyze the drivers of wind power development in the
United States as well as the relationship between renewable power plant location
and transmission congestion and emissions levels. I first examine the role of govern-
ment renewable energy incentives and access to the electricity grid on investment
in wind power plants across counties from 1998-2007. The results indicate that the
federal production tax credit, state-level sales tax credit and production incentives
play an important role in promoting wind power. In addition, higher wind power
penetration levels can be achieved by bringing more parts of the electricity transmis-
sion grid under independent system operator regulation. I conclude that state and
federal government policies play a significant role in wind power development both
by providing financial support and by improving physical and procedural access to
the electricity grid.
Second, I examine the effect of renewable power plant location on electric-
ity transmission congestion levels and system-wide emissions levels in a theoretical
model and a simulation study. A new renewable plant takes the effect of congestion
on its own output into account, but ignores the effect of its marginal contribution to
congestion on output from existing plants, which results in curtailment of renewable
power. Though pricing congestion removes the externality and reduces curtailment,
I find that in the absence of a price on emissions, pricing congestion may in some
cases actually increase system-wide emissions.
The final part of my dissertation deals with an econometric issue that emerged
from the empirical analysis of the drivers of wind power. I study the effect of
the degree of censoring on random-effects Tobit estimates in finite sample with a
particular focus on severe censoring, when the percentage of uncensored observations
reaches 1 to 5 percent. The results show that the Tobit model performs well even
at 5 percent uncensored observations with the bias in the Tobit estimates remaining
at or below 5 percent. Under severe censoring (1 percent uncensored observations),
large biases appear in the estimated standard errors and marginal effects. These are
generally reduced as the sample size increases in both N and T .
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The government of the United States is seeking to increase the share of elec-
tricity generated from renewable energy sources to mitigate climate change and
strengthen energy security. Despite government interest in promoting renewable
power, there has been no comprehensive quantitative analysis at the national level
of how federal and state policies, as well as access to the electricity grid, affect
wind power. In addition, the literature has paid little attention to the details of
integrating wind power into the existing electricity transmission infrastructure. In
particular, how does transmission congestion affect regional output from renewable
power plants, and what emissions reductions are actually achieved?
There is great variability in the type and level of renewable energy incen-
tives offered at the state-level. Incentives include sales, property and corporate tax
credits, production incentives, and renewable portfolio standards. Controlling for
wind capacity, population density, land values, electricity transmission line cover-
age and grid regulation type, I estimate in Chapter 2 the effects of state and fed-
eral renewable energy incentives on investment in wind power across counties from
1998-2007 via random effects Tobit, Probit, and ordinary least squares instrumental
variables regression. Based on the results, I provide first estimates of the relative
cost-effectiveness of these various incentives in promoting investment in wind power.
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The importance of government subsidies for renewable power is highlighted
in Chapter 2. However, subsidies for renewable power are not the most efficient
way of reducing emissions in the power sector. Subsidizing electricity generation by
renewable power plants reduces the price of electricity and thus increases consump-
tion and emissions relative to the alternative of pricing emissions at conventional
power plants and thereby increasing the price of electricity. In addition, since many
subsidies are set at the state rather than the federal level, several inefficiencies are
introduced.
First, because of differences in subsidies across states, renewable power is not
necessarily deployed in areas with high renewable energy potential and adequate
transmission capacity. Second, subsidies do not take into account that the abate-
ment achieved by renewable power plants varies across locations. A renewable power
plant at one location may substitute for an old, high-emissions coal plant and thus
achieve greater abatement than a renewable power plant at a different location that
substitutes for a cleaner natural gas plant. Third, state-level subsidies contribute to
the clustering of renewable power plants in states with the highest levels of incen-
tives, which leads to curtailment of renewable power due to transmission congestion.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the latter two points.
In Chapter 3, I examine the effect of renewable power plant location on electric-
ity transmission congestion levels and system-wide emissions levels. Two externali-
ties come into play: A congestion externality (1), since new renewable power plants
do not take into account the effect of their marginal contribution to congestion on
output from existing plants, and an emissions externality (2), since greenhouse gas
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emissions from conventional power plants are not priced according to their marginal
social cost. I develop a model to examine the interaction of these two externalities.
The model shows that, in contrast to individual profit-maximizing firms, a
social planner installs smaller sized power plants at some locations to minimize cur-
tailment and reduce idle capacity. The socially optimal outcome can be achieved
with the institution of a congestion price. The model also demonstrates that regional
energy subsidies that incentivize the clustering of renewable plants in particular ar-
eas are rendered less effective, since the resulting increase in transmission congestion
contributes to renewable power curtailment. Finally, I present the counter-intuitive
result that the institution of a congestion charge, in the absence of a price on emis-
sions, may in some cases increase system-wide emissions, despite the overall increase
in renewable power output and reduction in conventional power output. Two instru-
ments, a congestion price and an emissions price, are necessary to ensure optimal
investment in and location of new renewable power plants.
Chapter 3 also contains a simulation study of optimal power flow in a styl-
ized grid, the IEEE 30 bus test system. The simulations reveal that clustering of
renewable plants contributes to transmission congestion and that new renewable
plants can affect output at existing plants. Finally, the simulations make apparent
that the abatement achieved by a renewable power plant depends crucially on which
types of conventional power plants are forced to reduce output depending on the
arragenment of the plants within the grid.
Chapter 4 can stand alone as an econometric paper, though it addresses an
issue that arises in the empirical analysis of the drivers of wind power development in
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Chapter 2. In this chapter, I examine how the Tobit model performs in finite sample
when the dependent variable is severely censored, and determine the percentage bias
in the estimates of the coefficients, standard errors, marginal effects, and disturbance
standard deviation. The Monte Carlo method is used to analyze the effect on Tobit
estimates of varying the percentage of uncensored observations from 63 to 1 percent
in different sample sizes with N ∈ {1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000} and T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 8}.
I find that the Tobit model performs quite well even up to 5 percent uncensored
observations. However, when only 1 percent of the observations are uncensored, bias
appears in the estimates of the standard errors and marginal effects, in particular.
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Chapter 2
Wind Power Development in the United States
Abstract
This paper analyzes the drivers of wind power development in the United States,
focusing on government renewable energy incentives and access to the electricity
grid. The effects of wind capacity, electricity transmission line coverage and grid
regulation, as well as state and federal subsidies from 1998-2007 are estimated via
random effects Tobit, Probit, and ordinary least squares instrumental variables re-
gression. The results indicate that the federal production tax credit, state-level
sales tax credit and production incentives play an important role in promoting wind
power. In addition, higher wind power penetration levels can be achieved by bringing
more parts of the electricity transmission grid under independent system operator
regulation. This paper concludes that state and federal government policies play a
significant role in wind power development both by providing financial support and
by improving physical and procedural access to the electricity grid.
Keywords: Wind power; Renewable energy policy; Electricity grid
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2.1 Introduction
The United States (US) is striving to increase the share of electricity generated
from renewable energy sources to mitigate climate change and strengthen energy
security [1]. One of the most promising renewable energy sources in the US is wind.
In 2008, wind power contributed 42 percent of all new generating capacity [2]. Most
states have several policies in place to promote renewable energy, but state variability
on the level, duration, and combination of policies is extensive. Despite government
interest in promoting renewable energy, to date there has been no comprehensive
quantitative analysis at the national level of how federal and state policies, as well
as access to the electricity grid, affect wind power. This paper seeks to fill that void.
States employ various forms of incentives for renewable energy, including cor-
porate, sales, and property tax credits, as well as production incentives (awarded on
a ¢/kWh basis) and renewable portfolio standards. Wind plants across the US also
benefit from the federal production tax credit. As each incentive is associated with
a different cost and a different impact on additional investment in wind power, these
incentives will vary in their cost-effectiveness. Given that the federal and state gov-
ernments are interested in supporting renewable energy, it is important to identify
the effect of each policy instrument on wind power development.
This paper applies several estimation techniques to identify the effect of state
and federal renewable energy incentives and access to the electricity transmission
grid on annual additions to installed wind power capacity across counties from 1998-
2007. The panel Tobit model allows for censoring of the dependent variable (annual
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capacity additions in MW), since for most counties and time periods the dependent
variable is zero. This paper applies two techniques to control for the potential
endogeneity of state policies, which can occur when states pass policies to support
an already existing wind power industry. First, the panel Tobit regression is run on
a reduced sample that excludes states with investment occurring before any policy
was offered. Second, this paper employs instrumental variables in the ordinary
least squares (OLS) setting to control for the potential endogeneity of state policies.
All models include regressors to control for county windiness, income, population
density, distance to electricity demand centers, and technological improvement in
wind power plant design.
The regression results are robust across all models. The federal and state
production incentives, as well as the sales tax credit emerge as important drivers
of wind power development, with the production incentive registering as 2.5 times
more cost-effective than the sales tax credit. The most cost-effective way of in-
creasing wind power investment involves a regulatory change that expands coverage
of or creates additional regional transmission organizations (RTOs), which coordi-
nate transmission at a regional level to reduce operating inefficiencies. Expanding
transmission line coverage also increases additions to wind power capacity.
The existing literature on the effects of renewable energy policies on wind
power consists mainly of case studies and exploratory analyses with very few empir-
ical investigations. Bird et al. (2005) [3] provide an overview of policies and market
factors driving wind power development in 12 key states. Gouchoe et al. (2002)
[4] conduct case studies on financial incentives in six states. Much of the literature
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focuses on the effect of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) on wind power devel-
opment. Langniss and Wiser (2003) [5] investigate the implementation of an RPS
in Texas, Wiser et al. (2004) [6] evaluate the design and impacts of 13 state RPS
policies, Wiser et al. (2007) [7] provide an overview of federal RPS proposals and
investigate possible relationships between state and federal RPS policies, and Chen
(2009) [8] synthesize and review the results of 31 studies on the costs and benefits
of RPS policies.
Previous empirical studies have focused on the effect of an RPS on renewable
energy electricity generation. Carley (2009) [9] uses state-level data from 1998 to
2006. State subsidy policies including grants, loans, and rebates are collapsed into a
subsidy index and corporate, property, personal, and sales tax credits are collapsed
into a tax incentive index. The results indicate that renewable portfolio standards
do not significantly predict the percentage of electricity generation from renewable
energy but do increase the total amount of renewable energy generation.
Adelaja and Hailu (2007) [10] estimate the effect of an RPS on wind capacity
installations across the fifty states in 2008, and conclude that the effect is signifi-
cantly positive. Menz and Vachon (2006) [11] analyze the effect of an RPS, public
benefits funds, mandatory green power options, fuel generation disclosure rules and
retail choice on installed wind power capacity in 35 states in 2003 using OLS. Their
results indicate a positive relationship between an RPS and wind power develop-
ment.
Kneifel (2008) [12], following Menz and Vachon (2006) [11], estimates the
effect of an RPS and other policies on total non-hydropower renewable capacity for
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1996-2003 using OLS, again finding a positive effect. Yin and Powers (2010) [13]
undertake the most comprehensive study of the effect of an RPS on wind power
development, since they take into account the heterogeneity among RPS policies
across states. The results suggest that RPS policies have had a significant and
positive effect on in-state renewable energy development.
This paper builds on the existing case study literature and the empirical anal-
yses by providing a quantitative analysis of the drivers of wind power. It faces the
same main limitation as previous empirical studies - a low level of cross-sectional
variation in policy incentives set at the state level. However, this paper represents
several improvements. First, policy incentives are allowed to vary over time, which
is not the case in Menz and Vachon (2006) [11] and Adelaja and Hailu (2007) [10].
Second, this is the first paper to account for grid deregulation status and transmis-
sion line coverage, and allow both to vary at the county level. Finally, most of the
control variables, including windiness, vary at the county level. To my knowledge,
this is the first paper to use county-level data from 1998 to 2007, allow for varying
degrees of a policy among states, include federal as well as state incentives, identify
the separate effects of each type of policy instrument, and explicitly account for
wind capacity, access to the electricity grid, and grid deregulation status.
2.2 Determinants of Wind Power Profitability
The profitability and feasibility of a wind power plant at a given location are
determined by several factors. The windiness of the area is crucial to profitability,
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as the power in wind is proportional to the cube of its speed, so doubling the wind
speed causes power to increase by a factor of eight [14].
Next to wind speed, constancy and reliability affect the capacity factor of wind
plants. Most wind plants run 65-90 percent of the time, but not necessarily at full
capacity, since the wind does not blow steadily all the time. A capacity factor of
25-40 percent is common [15]. Wind plants do not operate when wind speeds are
too low or when they are too high during storms, as there is a risk of damaging
the turbine. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) distinguishes between
7 classes of wind power at a height of 50 meters (Table 2.1) [16]. Wind blows up to
12.5 miles per hour (mph) in power class 1 and over 26.6 mph in power class 7. In
general, sites with a wind power rating of 4 or higher are preferred for large scale
wind plants [15].
Table 2.1: Classes of Wind Power Density at 50 Meters
Wind Power Class Wind Power Density (W/m2) Speed m/s (mph)
1 0-200 0.0-5.6 (0.0-12.5)
2 200-300 5.6-6.4 (12.5-14.3)
3 300-400 6.4-7.0 (14.3-15.7)
4 400-500 7.0-7.5 (15.7-16.8)
5 500-600 7.5-8.0 (16.8-17.9)
6 600-800 8.0-8.8 (17.9-19.7)
7 800-2000 8.8-11.9 (19.7-26.6)
Source: [17]
Another important factor is distance to the electricity transmission grid. The
greater is the distance between the plant and the grid, the higher the cost to the
plant owner, since new plants bear the costs of connecting to the grid [18]. Figure
2.1 shows the location of wind power plants in Wyoming. The plants are clustered
alongside transmission lines, instead of locating in areas with higher wind potential.
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Figure 2.1: Wind Plant Location and the Transmission Grid
Wind power plants in Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado locate alongside the
electricity grid, foregoing locations with greater wind potential.
2.2.1 Policy Incentives
State and federal incentives have a considerable effect on the profitability of
wind plants. The main federal incentive is the renewable energy production tax
credit (PTC), currently at 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). It was first instituted
with the Energy Policy Act of 1992. After expiring in 2001, it was extended six times
for one or two years at a time, and actually expired twice. The latest extension in
2009 allows the PTC to expire in 2012. The importance of the PTC for the wind
power industry is evidenced by the boom-and-bust cycle of new plants in the past
10 years, following the expirations and short-term extensions of the PTC [19].
A variety of state incentives exist, mostly in the form of tax exemptions and
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credits. The level, combination, and duration of incentives vary significantly across
states. Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix list the renewable energy policies by
state.
A production incentive offered by a state government or a utility provides cash
payments based on the number of kWh generated by a wind power plant, usually
around 1-3 ¢/kWh. It is earned on an annual basis and varies with the amount of
electricity produced. Some are offered as a corporate tax credit, which can also take
the form of a tax credit for a percentage of equipment and installation costs.
All property tax incentives and the vast majority of sales tax incentives are
offered as tax exemptions rather than credits. A property tax incentive excludes
all or part of the added value of a renewable energy system from the valuation of
the property for taxation purposes [20]. A sales tax incentive exempts or refunds
the sales tax on the purchase of wind turbine equipment and installation services.
While the sales tax incentive is realized only once during the initial construction
period, the property tax incentive is realized annually.
State-level renewable portfolio standards require utilities to obtain a certain
percentage of their electricity from renewable energy sources. This policy places
the burden on utilities to incentivize electricity generation from renewable energy
sources. Failure to comply results in financial penalties on a per MWh basis.1 Util-
ities could, for example, enter into power-purchasing agreements with wind plants
1The average penalty is 49.63 $/MWh, ranging from 10 $/MWh in Montana to 62.13 $/MWh
in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. The penalties are significantly larger
than the price of a renewable energy credit (REC). In 2008, the weighted average price of a REC
was 4.48 $/MWh in Pennsylvania, one of three states requiring that REC pricing is disclosed to
the public [21]. In the voluntary REC market, the national price of RECs for wind power remained
below 5 $/MWh in 2007 [22].
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or offer production incentives on a ¢/kWh basis. Thus, a wind power plant could
receive financial incentives not only from the federal and state government but also
from the utility company it sells its electricity to.
The variability of state-level policy incentives has led to a potentially inefficient
allocation of wind plants across the US. The importance of policy incentives for wind
power development is made apparent in Figure 2.2. Wind power plants are clustered
along the Southwest border of Minnesota, while greater wind resources are available
in neighboring South Dakota. Minnesota was the first state to offer a 1¢/kWh
production incentive for wind energy in 1997, which could explain the high level of
wind power development.
Figure 2.2: Wnd Plant Location and State-Level Incentives
Wind power plants cluster along the Southwest border of Minnesota, while greater
wind resources are available in neighboring South Dakota.
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2.2.2 Intermittency
The transmission system operator must balance the changing demand of elec-
tricity consumers with the supply of electricity at every second, since electricity
cannot be stored. While traditional power plants are capable of nearly perfectly
predicting their supply, wind plants suffer from the intermittency of wind. There is
a cost associated with balancing wind energy and keeping back-up capacity.
In a review of the literature on wind integration costs, DeMeo et al. (2005)
[23] conclude that the impacts of wind variability on system operating costs are not
negligible but are relatively modest at less than 10 percent of the wholesale energy
value. Estimates of the total operating cost impact of wind power range from 1.85
to 4.97 $/MWh of wind power for 3.5 to 15 percent wind penetration, but could be
as low as 2.92 $/MWh for 29 percent penetration [23]. The costs depend on wind
forecasting, the size of the associated balancing authority, and the generation mix
and fuel costs. Integration costs are reduced in markets with sub-hourly dispatch
cycles of 5 to 15 minutes [24]. At higher penetration levels, transmission system
operators begin to incur significant additional expenses to provide back-up and
balancing capacity to deal with the variability of wind. These levels of penetration
have not yet been reached in the US, indicating that there is still growth potential.
2.2.3 Regional Transmission Organizations
In 2000, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) supported the
creation of RTOs, also called independent system operators (ISOs), which coordinate
14
transmission at a regional level to reduce operating inefficiencies. Several RTOs were
created in the 2000s, though large parts of the grid are still operated by utilities. A
map of RTOs can be found in Figure A.1 of the Appendix.
What type of grid a wind power plant interconnects to is an important factor
for profitability. In a grid operated by an RTO, access to congested lines could be
broader than in a grid operated by a utility that also owns generation facilities.
Furthermore, RTO-operated grids are typically larger and more efficient than those
operated by utilities, since RTOs can reduce costs through improved grid reliability,
reduced reserve requirements, increased market liquidity, and coordinated planning
for new generation and transmission resources [24, 25, 26]. Larger grids are better
able to handle an intermittent resource like wind energy, since lack of wind in one
area can be compensated by wind blowing in another area. Finally, costs to the
wind plant resulting from inadvertent schedule deviations are typically lower under
RTO regulation than under utility regulation [24].
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Estimation Sample
Many states have at least some incentive policies in place for renewable and
clean energy. Typically, a state government decides on a menu of policies ranging
from tax incentives to renewable portfolio standards. At first glance, it is unclear
how each policy instrument contributes to wind power development. Econometric
analysis can help identify the separate effect of each policy instrument on wind
15
power development at a particular location.
One method of investigating the effect of policies is to look at firm-level data.
In this case, each observation would be a firm that could own one or several wind
power plants in different locations. The problem with this type of analysis is that, by
definition, only those locations that have proved attractive to a wind power investor
are included in the sample. Locations with perhaps poor policy incentives are not
part of the sample. In order to get a more complete picture of the problem, it is
necessary to include in the sample locations that have not managed to attract wind
power investors.
For this reason, all locations are included in the sample analyzed in this paper.
Since there could theoretically be an infinite number of potential locations for wind
power plants, for simplicity, the county is chosen as the unit of analysis. Each county
has a different level of attractiveness in terms of profitability to potential investors.
Counties that are technically infeasible locations for wind power plants are
excluded from the sample, such as counties with an average wind power class less
than or equal to 1, as well as counties with a population density greater than 2,100
population per square mile.
2.3.2 Assumptions
The model is based on several assumptions. First, the electricity price is
assumed to be exogenous - that is, any additional wind power capacity will have no
effect on the electricity price. Second, there is always demand for added generation
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capacity due to population and GDP growth in all three interconnects (Western,
Eastern, and Texas). Third, no grid is completely saturated with wind power, i.e. no
grid is unable to accept additional wind power due to system stability constraints.
Fourth, electricity industry deregulation has made it possible to completely
separate electricity production from transmission and distribution. This is partic-
ularly true of investment in wind power, since in the 1998 to 2007 period 99 to 88
percent, respectively, of additional capacity came from independent power producers
that are engaged solely in electricity generation (Figure 2.3) [27]. Only a minority of
investment came from utilities, some of which may own transmission/distribution
facilities.2 Furthermore, utility investment in wind power picks up only in 2004,
well after the start of deregulation in 1996, when FERC required all public utilities
that own or operate transmission facilities to offer an open access transmission tariff
to any supplier [28]. By 2004, deregulation of the industry is well underway and
generation occurs separately from transmission/distribution.
Given these assumptions, investment in wind generation subject to transmis-
sion losses can be separated from ownership and operation of transmission and
distribution lines. The transmission and distribution grid is therefore exogenous
to a firm’s investment decision. Only variables that affect a firm’s decision of the
location and size of wind power plants matter.
The state policy variables may violate the exogeneity assumption. It is pos-
sible that policy incentives are endogenous, if (1) they are passed to support an
2In 1998 for the electricity industry as a whole (not just limited to wind power plants), 16
percent of the utilities were involved in both generation and transmission/distribution, 45 percent
in transmission/distribution only, and 34 percent in generation only (including independent power
producers) [28].
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative Installed Wind Power Capacity (MW) by Independent
Power Producers & Utilities and Turbine Size (MW)
Source: [27] and [29]
already existing wind industry; or (2) if they are only passed by states with high
wind potential. This paper addresses both sources of endogeneity. However, the
second source of endogeneity is mitigated by the fact that policies are geared to-
wards renewables in general, and may be driven by other technologies, such as solar
power. In addition, county-level windiness controls for any bias in the estimates
of state policies that might occur without the presence of this control. That is,
endogeneity arising from the fact that states with high wind power potential may
institute generous incentives is controlled for by the inclusion of the wind power
class variable, which varies across counties.
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2.3.3 Econometric Models: Tobit and Instrumental Variables
The dependent variable yit is the addition to existing capacity (if any) in county
i in period t. For most counties and for most time periods this will be zero, since in
2007 only 122 out of 2,152 counties in the sample host wind plants. Since yit takes
on the value of zero with positive probability and is close to continuous for yit > 0,
the most appropriate model is the censored regression or corner solution model. For
this type of limited dependent variable, traditional estimation techniques, such as
OLS, lead to inconsistent estimators.
The panel Tobit estimators are obtained by maximum likelihood. This paper
uses a random effects model rather than a fixed effects model, since the number of
time periods T is small compared to the number of counties N . Parameter estimates
obtained by maximum likelihood estimation of a nonlinear fixed effects model are
inconsistent if no sufficient statistic for the fixed effects exists, as is the case for
panel Tobit. As N → ∞, the fixed effects (incidental parameters) are estimated
inconsistently, since each fixed effect depends on only T observations. This is the
incidental parameters problem first analyzed by Neyman and Scott (1948) for the
linear regression model [30].
Let the vector Xit consist of the explanatory variables discussed above. Then
for the i = 1, . . . , N counties and t = 1, . . . , T time periods the model to be estimated
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is as follows. Define latent wind power capacity additions y∗it as
y∗it = Xitβ + εit
εit = νi + ηit.






0 if y∗it ≤ 0.
The error term εit is composed of a time-invariant county-specific random effect
νi and an idiosyncratic error ηit that varies over time and across counties. Assume
that ∀ i 6= j, t 6= s
E [νiνj] = 0, νi ∼ N(0, σ2ν)
E [ηitηis] = 0, ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η)
and that the county-specific random effect νi is orthogonal to the covariates Xit.
Any unobserved time-invariant county-specific variables that affect wind power de-
velopment and that are not included in the estimation would be contained in the
error term νi. For example, νi could include the willingness of a county’s residents
to accept wind turbines in their view-shed, though this is likely to vary throughout
the county and may change over time. It is difficult to determine whether the unob-
served characteristics are correlated with any of the included independent variables.
Willingness to accept might be partly captured by income and population density.
However, the regression equation already includes several control variables, justify-
ing the assumption that the county-specific effect νi is orthogonal to the covariates
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Xit.
The assumption of zero covariance is not trivial. For a firm, the total costs
of setting up two plants in two neighboring counties are likely to be less than the
total costs of setting up two plants in two counties separated by a great distance.
The cost savings are due to economies of scale in construction and maintenance.
Similarly, profits are not completely separable over time. The total costs to the firm
of setting up a second plant in a county already containing one plant are likely to be
less than the total costs of setting up a second plant in a different county. Thus, the
optimal wind capacity to install (and thus the error term in an econometric model)
could be correlated over space and time.
Even outside the economies-of-scale argument, for the case when several firms
are involved, there is potential for cost savings. For a new firm entering a county
with existing wind plants, costs can be smaller due to smoother proceedings with
local government, since employees are more experienced in dealing with wind plants,
and the availability of a more experienced work force. However, these types of cost
reductions are likely to be much smaller when the wind plants are owned by different
firms rather than a single firm.
While the potential for correlation of errors is acknowledged, since only 14
percent of firms in the dataset own more than one wind plant and the potential
cost reductions are small compared to total costs, it is assumed that errors are
uncorrelated. However, ownership data is available only for 45 percent of the sample.
The severe degree of censoring in the panel Tobit models estimated in this
paper does not present a problem from a theoretical point of view, but could have
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finite sample implications. The panel sample considered consists of only close to 1
percent uncensored observations across counties and over time. How the random-
effects Tobit model handles this type of severe censoring in finite sample is explored
in Chapter 4. The study finds that for T = 8 and N = 2000 when only 1 percent
of the observations are uncensored, the bias in the estimates of the coefficients,
standard errors, marginal effects, and disturbance standard deviation remains below
5 percent.
Under these assumptions, maximum likelihood estimation leads to consistent
and efficient estimates. When the residuals are serially dependent, Tobit estimators
are still consistent, though inefficient [31]. However, including the lag dependent
variable as a regressor could lead to endogeneity, unless the errors follow an auto-
regressive process of order one (AR(1)). Similarly, there is potential for endogeneity
in the policy variables. To account for endogeneity of the lag dependent variable and
the policy variables, an instrumental variables (IV) model based on random-effects
OLS is employed. The severity of policy endogeneity is also tested by estimating the
Tobit model on a reduced sample that excludes states with a pre-trend in investment
occurring before policies are offered.
As yet, there is no computationally accessible method of using instrumental
variables in a panel random-effects Tobit model. As both the IV and Tobit mod-
els have their strengths and weaknesses, this paper draws conclusions based on a




2.4.1 Wind Power Plants
The dependent variable is the addition in MW to existing installed wind capac-
ity in county i in year t. For most counties and for most time periods, the dependent
variable is zero. County area is included as a control variable, since larger counties
can physically host more wind turbines than smaller counties.
Information on existing wind plants in the US built in the period 1975-2007
was obtained from the EIA [32]. The dataset includes information on the generating
capacity, number of turbines, and geographic information system (GIS) location.
Figure A.2 in the Appendix depicts a low-resolution map of US wind resources and
power plants.
About 94 percent of wind capacity was installed after 1990, 91 percent after
1998, and 85 percent after 2000 (Figure 2.3). Figure 2.4 shows the wind power in-
stallations by state. Texas, Iowa, and California have the most wind power capacity,
though growth in California has recently stalled.
2.4.2 Transmission Grid Variables
Two variables are included to measure access to the electricity grid. The
total length of transmission lines (calculated as the sum of lengths in miles of all
lines passing through the county) divided by the county area in square miles is a
measure of a county’s transmission line coverage. The second variable measuring
access to the grid is an indicator variable for the presence of an RTO regulator. The
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Figure 2.4: Wind Power Capacity Installations (MW) by State
transmission grids regulated by RTOs are not confined to state boundaries, so this
indicator variable varies across counties and over time.
The GIS map of the electricity transmission grid for the contiguous US comes
from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, which obtained it from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency [17]. The map is somewhat dated (from 1993), but
there has been little expansion of the grid since 1990.3
2.4.3 Policy Variables
Next to access to the electricity grid, the main regressors of interest are the
state and federal tax incentives. The regression includes variables for state-level
sales, corporate, and property tax incentives, renewable portfolio standards, pro-
3Capital investment in grid expansion has decreased steadily since the 1970s and decreased by
one half from 1994 to 1998 [33].
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duction incentives, and the federal production tax credit. Information on state
incentive policies for renewable energy was obtained from the Database on State
Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency [20].
The presence of the state-level corporate tax credit is measured by an indicator
variable, since the format of the tax credit varies considerably across states. The
sales tax incentive is 100 percent in all states that offer this incentive, but the tax rate
varies from 4-7 percent across states. The variable capturing the sales tax incentive
equals the appropriate tax rate and is equal to zero for states not offering the
incentive. Property tax incentives are measured as the assessed valuation reduction
in percent, ranging from 50-100 percent.
The incentives mentioned above have different spatial implications. Corporate
and property tax incentives only apply within the state they are offered in. The
benefit of a sales tax exemption extends beyond the borders of a state that offers
this type of incentive. Wind power plants in neighboring states can purchase turbine
parts in states that offer sales tax exemptions.
Any production incentive offered by a state or by a utility to its distribution
region is measured in ¢/kWh. Utilities that institute production incentives for
renewable energy are typically responding to consumer demand for green electricity
or state-mandated renewable portfolio standards. Production incentives offered by
state governments have an effect only on within-state wind power development,
while those offered by utilities can cross state borders, since the distribution grid
of power companies is not confined to state boundaries. This variable thus varies
across counties.
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The RPS consists of a target standard and an implementation year, such as
20 percent by 2025. It is converted into one variable, by linearly increasing the
standard from 0 percent to the target percentage from the announcement year to
the implementation year. The effect of an RPS is also not bounded within the state.4
The linearized RPS variable for border counties (county centroid is within 60 miles
of a state border) takes on the value of the RPS in its own or neighboring state,
whichever is larger. Thus, the RPS variable varies across counties rather than just
states. The linearized RPS variable excludes portions of the state’s RPS that are
set aside for other technologies, such as solar, and are thus not available to wind
power.
2.4.4 Wind Capacity
The main control variable to include is the wind power class, since the windi-
ness of a location is an important factor for productivity. Wind class GIS data for
most US states was obtained from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory [17].
The wind maps of high resolution (200m cell size) give the wind power class defined
by the annual average wind speeds. The county wind power class is calculated as a
spatial average based on this high resolution data.
Wind data for Texas was obtained from the Alternative Energy Institute at
West Texas A&M University [34].5 Minnesota wind data was obtained from the
Minnesota Department of Commerce [35]. High resolution wind data for Alabama,
4Iowa is surrounded by states with ambitious RPS laws, which has had a positive effect on wind
power development.
5I thank the Alternative Energy Institute for sharing GIS data on wind capacity in Texas.
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Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina are unavailable. The
low-resolution wind map (Figure A.2) shows that these states have very limited wind
resources, below the minimum wind speed level necessary to generate electricity.
This can justify the exclusion of these states from the estimation sample.
2.4.5 Control Variables
The state annual average retail price of electricity was obtained from the EIA
and controls for the positive relationship between price and profits of electricity
suppliers [36]. County annual per capita income for the sample period was obtained
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis [37].
State and county GIS data were obtained from the Environment and Systems
Research Institute [38]. The dataset includes county-level population density from
2000 (for years 1998-2002) and from 2005 (for years 2003-2007), county area, and
county average land value (measured as the sales of agricultural products per farm
in 1997 in thousands of dollars). Distance to the nearest city, which controls for
access to electricity demand centers, was calculated based on county and city GIS
data.
Finally, it is important to control for technological changes in wind turbines
and plant designs over time. Figure 2.3 shows how turbine sizes have increased over
the sample period. This paper accounts for technological change with a third-order
polynomial time trend.6
6The regression results are robust to accounting for technological change using average turbine
size over time. The annual average turbine size (capacity in MW) over time was obtained from
the Department of Energy [29].
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2.4.6 Instruments
In the IV model, the state policies are instrumented with the ratio of Democrats
to Republicans in the state lower and upper houses (varying over time and across
states) and in the US House and Senate (varying over time only) [39], the percentage
of US House representatives by state voting for the Waxman/Markey Climate Bill7
(varying across states only) [40], and the state marginal damages of sulfur dioxide
pollution (varying across states only) [41].
The state-level marginal damages of sulfur dioxide (SO2) pollution represent
each state’s conceivable interest in reducing SO2 pollution, and are a good mea-
sure of a state’s willingness to adopt policies that promote renewable energy as
an alternative to conventional energy, which contributes to SO2 pollution [41]. A
House Representative voting for the Waxman/Markey Climate Bill gives another
indication of constituent interest in promoting renewable energy. Finally, the ratio
of Democrats to Republicans in state and federal legislatures is likely to be higher
in areas that favor promoting renewable energy. Tests on the validity of the instru-
ments for the state policies and the lag dependent variable are presented in Table
2.4.
2.5 Results and Discussion
Summary statistics for the 1998-2007 period can be found in Table A.1 in the
Appendix. In 2007, wind power plants were installed in 122 of the 2,152 counties
7H.R. 2454 (111th): American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 sponsored by Represen-
tatives Waxman and Markey
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included in the regression sample. The table divides the sample into two subsets:
county-time observations with positive and zero installed wind power capacity. The
subset of county-time observations with positive installed wind capacity has a signif-
icantly higher wind power class, higher levels of all policy incentives, higher income,
land value, and electricity price, smaller distance to the nearest city, and is more
likely to have an RTO-regulated electricity grid.
Panel data analysis is based on the period 1998-2007, since 91 percent of
wind power investment occurred after 1998. As a robustness check, several models
are considered, including the Tobit, panel OLS, Probit, and linear probability model
(LPM). The results are presented in Table 2.3. The Tobit model allows for censoring
of the dependent variable, since yearly additions to capacity are non-zero for only 1
percent of the observations. While the Tobit, Probit, and OLS models use random
effects, as a robustness check the LPM uses county fixed effects with errors clustered
at the state level. The IV model results that control for the potential endogeneity
of state policies and the lag dependent variable are presented in Table 2.4.
Two samples are analyzed via Tobit regression. Column (1) of Table 2.3
presents the estimates for the full sample, while column (2) presents the estimates
for a reduced sample that excludes 11 states that exhibit a pre-trend in investment.8
The Tobit estimates of the two samples are very similar with the same significance
level, indicating that the endogeneity bias is relatively small. The Tobit and OLS
estimates (Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 2.3) coincide in sign and significance
8In AK, CA, CO, IL, ME, NE, NM, PA, SD, WI, and WY wind power investment occurred
before any state renewable energy policy was offered.
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level, though not in magnitude, since the OLS model does not take into account
censoring of the dependent variable. The Probit model does not perform well, but
the LPM identifies the production incentive, the federal production tax credit, and
RTO regulation as important drivers of wind power investment, confirming the
results of the Tobit model. The LPM necessarily excludes variables that do not
vary over time, since the model includes county fixed effects. These results provide
an important robustness check, since the identification of policy variables relies on
variation over time only and not across counties.
Though the instruments are arguably crude, the joint significance of the in-
struments in the first stage is very high, passing the 1 percent significance level in
the case of each policy measure. With these instruments all policy measures prove
endogenous at 1 percent significance based on endogeneity tests (Column (5) of Ta-
ble 2.4). However, none of the five policy variables remain significant, when they
are instrumented at the same time, perhaps because the instruments are not strong
enough. I limit myself to instrumenting three policy measures at a time. While
the coefficient estimates do not change much across the different models, the signif-
icance of the coefficients does. This indicates that there is not enough variation in
the instruments. In all models, the corporate tax credit is no longer significant, but
the sales and property tax credits and the production incentive are significant in
some models. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the property tax credit is significantly
negative.9
9An exemption from local property taxes is comparable to a subsidy of $15,840, assuming a 1
MW plant at a cost of $1,650,000 and a property tax rate of 0.96 percent [42, 43]. The property
tax credit for renewable energy is one of the first policy measures instituted in many states, several
years ahead of any other state or federal measure. By itself, the property tax credit may not have
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Finally, including the lag dependent variable as an explanatory variable can
introduce bias, unless the error term is exactly an AR(1) process. Column (4) of
Table 2.4 presents the results for instrumenting for the lag dependent variable with
lags of other covariates. The additional instruments for lag log capacity additions
are the lag state upper and lower house ratios of Democrats to Republicans, lag
electricity price, lag RTO regulated grid, and lag federal production tax credit.
Here, the lag log capacity additions are no longer significant. However, the null
hypothesis of exogeneity could not be rejected with a p-value of 0.3750, indicating
that including the lag dependent variable does not introduce a significant amount
of bias through endogeneity.
While the instruments pass the valid instrument test in the cases presented in
Table 2.4, this is not the case when the policies are instrumented one at a time. It
appears that the instruments are only valid for the sales and property tax credit, as
well as the production incentive.10 This may explain why the corporate tax credit
and renewable portfolio standard, when instrumented, are not significant.
The main result is that the policies remain significant and the coefficients do
not change much between the IV approach and the standard OLS approach. This
suggests that, while endogeneity is a concern, the bias is not substantial. The sales
tax credit and production incentive, in particular, are significant determinants of
been enough to incentive wind power development. In addition, community and local government
approval may not be gained, if local disamenities resulting from the wind plant are not offset by the
proceeds from the property tax. This may explain why the coefficient is not significantly positive.
10The null hypothesis of valid instruments for the corporate tax credit, the renewable portfolio
standard, and lag log capacity additions is rejected with p-values of 0.0047, 0.0027, and 0.0063, re-
spectively. The null hypothesis of valid instruments cannot be rejected for the production incentive,
sales, and property tax credit with p-values of 0.5192, 0.4647, 0.2564, respectively.
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wind power investment, while the positive effect of the corporate tax credit (though
identified as significant in the Tobit model) is questionable.
Overall, I conclude that the endogeneity bias in the Tobit model is likely
relatively small, since the Tobit estimates do not change much when excluding
states with a pre-trend in investment. This bias may be smaller than the bias
present in the IV model, which suffers from weak instruments and does not account
for censoring of the dependent variable. For this reason, more weight is given to the
Tobit estimates.
Based on the Tobit model estimates in column (1) of Table 2.3, annual in-
stalled capacity increases by 27.8 percent for a one unit increase in the wind power
class. The federal PTC also has a large and significant effect, with annual capacity
additions increasing by 24.2 percent in a PTC expiration year. This type of federal
support for wind power on a per kWh basis proves to play an important role in wind
power development.
Access to the electricity grid emerges as a key factor for wind power develop-
ment. If a county’s electricity grid is regulated by an RTO, annual capacity additions
increase by 20.0 percent. The total length of transmission lines (calculated as the
sum of lengths of all lines passing through the county) normalized by the county
area is a measure of electricity grid coverage and is inversely related to distance to
the grid. As expected, it is positively related to wind power development, since a
higher ratio of lines to county area would improve access to the grid by reducing
the distance from any given location in the county to the grid. Doubling the county
average 0.142 miles of transmission line per square mile would lead to a 10.8 percent
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increase in annual installed capacity. While both variables measuring grid access
are important, a significant boost to wind power development can be achieved even
without costly expansion of the grid. The government can improve access by re-
quiring RTO-regulation in all regions. Of course, expansion of the grid is required
to tap into more remote wind resources and accommodate increases in generation
capacity.
The corporate and sales tax incentives, as well as the production incentive, all
have positive and significant coefficient estimates. Property tax incentives appear
to have no or even a negative effect on wind power development. The presence of
corporate tax credits increases annual capacity additions by 21.9 percent. In the
IV model, the effect is 4.9 percent (column (1) of Table 2.4), though censoring of
the dependent variable is not taken into account. An increase in the production
incentive by 1 ¢/kWh would increase annual capacity additions by 20.0 percent
(Tobit) or 8.7 percent (IV). Finally, increasing the sales tax credit by one additional
percentage point would increase annual capacity additions by 4.2 percent (Tobit) or
1.0 percent (IV).
2.5.1 Cost-Effectiveness of Various Policies
Table 2.2 presents estimates of the cost-effectiveness of several policies for
increasing wind power penetration. The most cost-effective way of increasing wind
power investment involves an expansion of coverage or creation of additional RTOs.
Counties with grids that are regulated by RTOs can expect a 20 percent increase in
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annual additions to installed wind power capacity. This increase in wind power can
be achieved at a modest organizational cost to regulators and power plant owners.
Given assumptions on investment costs, it is possible to compare the cost-
effectiveness of the sales tax and production incentive. A 1 MW turbine cost
$1,650,000 in 2005 [42]. If a sales tax reduction of 1 percent were offered, this
would cost the state $16,500 and would lead to an annual capacity increase of 4.2
percent. The same turbine operating at a 35 percent capacity factor would generate
0.35 ·24 ·365 = 3, 066 MWh/year = 3,066,000 kWh/year. A 1¢/kWh production in-
centive would cost the government $30,660 per year and would achieve a 20 percent
increase in annual capacity additions. The production incentive achieves a 0.652
percent increase in annual capacity additions per thousand dollars spent, while the
sales tax incentive achieves only 0.255 percent.
The corporate tax credit comes in various forms. In order to perform a cost-
effectiveness calculation, it is assumed that the corporate tax credit amounts to 50
percent of equipment and installation costs, estimated here at $1,650,000 for a 1
MW wind plant. The corporate tax credit thus provides $825,000 to a 1 MW wind
plant and results in an increase in annual capacity additions by 21.9 percent. This
amounts to a 0.0265 percent increase in annual capacity additions per thousand
dollars spent.
The average county has 0.142 miles of transmission line per square mile area.
With an average county size of 1,147 square miles, this amounts to 163 miles of
transmission lines for the average county. Increasing the coverage by 10 percent to
0.156 miles of lines per square mile would require installation of an additional 16
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miles of transmission lines and would result in a total cost of $24 million, assuming
a transmission line installation cost of $1.5 million per mile [44]. The benefit of
expanding transmission line coverage would be an increase in annual capacity addi-
tions by 1.03 percent. Assuming the installation cost of additional transmission lines
could be spread over 20 years, the increase in transmission line coverage achieves a
0.000858 percent increase in annual capacity additions per thousand dollars spent.
Expanding transmission coverage is therefore several orders of magnitude less cost-
effective than either the production incentive or the sales tax credit. However, this
cost estimate assumes that the transmission lines would be randomly placed over the
county. In reality, a single well-placed transmission line could result in significant
additional wind capacity coming on line. Expanding transmission capacity, though
expensive, will eventually become necessary to increasing investment in wind power.
Table 2.2: Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Policies
Policy Annual capacity additions (%)
per thousand dollars spent
RTO regulated grid 20.0a
Production incentive 0.652
Sales tax credit 0.255
Corporate tax credit 0.0265
Transmission line coverage 0.000858
a This estimate assumes that establishing an RTO or becoming a member in an RTO imposes no
organizational costs on regulators and power plant owners.
2.5.2 Limitations
Some care must be taken when interpreting the results, since there are limi-
tations to the models and estimation procedures. First, it is unclear how the Tobit
model performs when the number of uncensored observations is small relative to
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the number of censored observations, though the Monte Carlo study in Chapter
4 indicates that the Tobit model performs reasonably well. Second, the sample is
relatively small with only 2,152 counties included in each regression. The estimates
are consistent only as N →∞ with fixed T . Third, there are omitted variables, such
as land cover (distinguishing between differing degrees of vegetation cover), investor
expectations, and community opposition, leading to omitted variable bias.
While the IV approach addresses the endogeneity problem, the issue of cen-
soring remains. As yet, there is no computationally accessible method of using
instrumental variables in a panel random-effects Tobit model. The endogeneity bias
present in the Tobit model is likely relatively small, since the Tobit estimates for
the full sample are very similar to those for the reduced sample excluding states
with a pre-trend in investment. It is unclear to what extent the IV model suffers
from weak instrument bias and misspecification by ignoring the issue of censoring.
For this reason, the conclusions of this paper are based more heavily on the Tobit
results, though the IV results are also considered, as both the IV and Tobit models
have their strengths and weaknesses.
Though it is argued that wind plant ownership is separate from transmission
infrastructure ownership, 1 percent (1998) to 12 percent (2007) of wind plant capac-
ity is owned by utilities. The dataset does not contain information on whether these
utilities also own transmission lines. Given this possibility, the separation between
generation and transmission, and in fact the separation between supply and demand,
is not complete. Ignoring this incomplete separation would attenuate the effect of
the variables measuring access to the grid, since utilities that simultaneously own
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wind plants and transmission lines will have an incentive to ease the interconnection
process both procedurally and financially.
The main limitation lies in the relatively small degree of cross-sectional vari-
ation for those types of policy incentives that are set at the state rather than the
county level. These include corporate, property, and sales tax incentives. With
respect to these policy incentives, this paper faces the same limitation as previous
empirical studies. However, this paper represents several improvements. First, the
policy incentives vary over time, as not all previous empirical studies have allowed.
Second, the production incentive, linearized renewable portfolio standard, and grid
deregulation status vary at the county level. Finally, the control variables of windi-
ness and transmission line coverage vary at the county level as well. With this
increase in cross-sectional variation, the separate effect of these policy instruments
on wind power development can be more credibly identified.
2.6 Conclusion
With strong growth rates in the past three years, the wind power industry is set
to become an important player in the electricity industry. The federal production tax
credit and the state-level corporate tax credit, sales tax incentive, and production
incentives emerge as significant drivers of wind power development, of which the
production incentive ranks as the most cost-effective.
Access to the electricity grid is another important factor for wind power devel-
opment. Higher wind power penetration levels can be achieved very cost-effectively
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by bringing more parts of the electricity transmission grid under RTO regulation.
RTOs introduce competitive wholesale markets for electricity, facilitate the inter-
connection procedures for wind plants, adapt schedule deviation penalties to the
physical requirements of wind power technology, and provide supply scheduling that
is closer to real time than in grids regulated by local utilities. Expanding the grid to
include more remote windy areas, though expensive, could also significantly impact
wind power development.
This paper concludes that state and federal government policies play a sig-
nificant role in wind power development both by providing financial support and
by improving access to the electricity grid. Further deregulation of the electricity
industry is likely to improve the ability of wind power to contribute to the US elec-
tricity generation portfolio. In view of the importance of state incentives for wind
power, future research could focus on whether the variability of state-level policy
incentives has led to a potentially inefficient allocation of wind plants across the US.
38
Table 2.3: Wind Power Capacity 1998-2007
Dependent Variable Log capacity additions (MW) Capacity additions (0/1)
Tobit marginal effects OLS Probit ME LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag log capacity additions (MW) 0.0543*** 0.0385* 0.222*** 0.0000681 0.00774
(2.86) (1.82) (28.46) (1.29) (0.87)
Wind power class 0.245*** 0.248*** 0.0220*** 0.000233*
(6.73) (5.70) (7.24) (1.76)
Corporate tax credit (0/1) 0.198** 0.306*** 0.0334*** 0.000305 0.0104
(2.16) (2.95) (3.67) (1.14) (1.27)
Sales tax credit 0.0409*** 0.0599*** 0.00396*** 0.0000408 0.000107
(sales tax rate in %) (3.44) (4.33) (3.03) (1.56) (0.13)
Property tax credit -0.0214 -0.0673 -0.0113* -0.0000224 -0.000787
(% reduction of assessed value) (-0.34) (-0.78) (-1.80) (-0.35) (-0.12)
Production incentive (¢/kWh) 0.182*** 0.226*** 0.0220*** 0.000183 0.00317**
(4.50) (4.78) (4.90) (1.60) (2.14)
Linearized renewable portfolio -0.00458 -0.000325 0.000138 -0.00000433 -0.000713*
standard (%) (-0.69) (-0.04) (0.13) (-0.63) (-1.85)
PTC expiration year (0/1) 0.217*** 0.204*** 0.0229*** 0.000313 0.00555**
(3.86) (3.17) (3.69) (1.52) (2.36)
Transmission line coverage 0.725*** 0.670** 0.0808*** 0.000679
(miles/square mile area) (3.02) (2.14) (3.83) (1.55)
RTO regulated grid (0/1) 0.182*** 0.175** 0.0162** 0.000215 0.00549*
(3.05) (2.42) (2.45) (1.48) (1.90)
Electricity price (retail, ¢/kWh) 0.0635*** 0.0758*** 0.00623*** 0.0000613* 0.00741***
(4.17) (4.28) (3.49) (1.68) (3.01)
Income per capita (millions) 0.00666* 0.00502 0.00125** 0.00000619 -0.000278
(1.67) (0.69) (2.33) (1.19) (-0.89)
Population density -0.000537** -0.000930** -0.0000678*** -0.000000502 -0.0000171
(population/square mile) (-2.32) (-2.29) (-3.84) (-1.40) (-0.16)
Distance to nearest city (miles) -0.00173 -0.00140 -0.000183 -0.00000173
(-0.79) (-0.57) (-0.99) (-0.74)
Agricultural sales/farm 0.000171 0.0000779 0.0000366* 0.000000179
(thousands, 1997) (1.08) (0.44) (1.91) (0.97)
County area (square miles) 0.0000369** 0.0000165 0.00000416** 3.56e-08
(2.14) (0.65) (2.40) (1.39)
Time index -0.0200 0.0464 0.00358 -0.0000300 0.000783
(-0.18) (0.36) (0.30) (-0.27) (0.32)
Time index squared -0.00150 -0.0154 -0.00182 7.70e-08 -0.000408
(-0.07) (-0.63) (-0.75) (0.00) (-0.65)
Time index cubed 0.000428 0.00119 0.000180 0.000000324 0.0000308
(0.35) (0.86) (1.24) (0.27) (0.73)
Constant -0.0956*** -0.0209
(-4.84) (-0.58)
Observations 21520 15840 21520 21520 21520
Number of counties 2152 1584 2152 2152 2152
Uncensored observations 205 141 205
Error structure RE RE RE RE FE, errors
clustered by state
*** Significant at 1 percent level, ** Significant at 5 percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level
Z-statistics in parentheses. Marginal effects (ME) conditional on the dependent variable greater than zero are
reported for the Tobit and Probit models. LPM stands for linear probability model, RE for random effects, and FE
for fixed effects. To control for policy endogeneity, the Tobit model in column (2) excludes counties in states with
a pre-trend in investment, i.e. wind power investment occurring before renewable energy policies were offered.
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Table 2.4: Wind Power Capacity 1998-2007: Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable IV IV IV IV Exogeneity
Log capacity additions (MW) (1) (2) (3) (4) test p-value
Lag log capacity additions (MW) 0.220*** 0.224*** 0.221*** -0.149 0.3750
(26.03) (27.15) (25.05) (-0.57)
Wind power class 0.0283*** 0.0340*** 0.0298*** 0.0453***
(7.40) (6.06) (5.33) (4.72)
Corporate tax credit (0/1) 0.0474 0.0349 0.0628*** 0.0537 0.0002
(1.11) (0.79) (2.73) (1.36)
Sales tax credit 0.0101 0.0144** 0.0135 0.0197*** 0.0001
(sales tax rate in %) (1.35) (2.39) (1.54) (3.01)
Property tax credit -0.0354** -0.0801*** -0.0553 -0.112*** 0.0002
(% reduction of assessed value) (-2.20) (-3.27) (-1.23) (-3.45)
Production incentive (¢/kWh) 0.0832** 0.0227*** 0.0618 0.0330*** 0.0003
(2.36) (3.57) (1.01) (3.44)
Linearized renewable portfolio -0.000410 0.00161 0.000350 0.00301* 0.0009
standard (%) (-0.32) (1.34) (0.16) (1.90)
PTC expiration year (0/1) 0.0289*** 0.0282*** 0.0283*** 0.0254***
(4.14) (4.12) (4.03) (3.41)
Transmission line length 0.0851*** 0.0949*** 0.0903*** 0.127***
(miles/square mile area) (3.56) (3.79) (3.49) (3.72)
RTO regulated grid (0/1) 0.0375** 0.0278** 0.0303 0.0403***
(2.28) (2.22) (1.56) (2.75)
Electricity price (retail, ¢/kWh) 0.00772*** 0.00529** 0.00730*** 0.00553**
(3.36) (2.26) (2.82) (2.34)
Income per capita (millions) 0.000921 0.000868 0.000874 0.00144*
(1.57) (1.47) (1.48) (1.93)
Population density -0.0000630*** -0.0000710*** -0.0000645*** -0.0000986***
(population/square mile) (-3.12) (-3.53) (-3.13) (-3.43)
Distance to nearest city (miles) -0.000170 -0.000144 -0.000152 -0.000199
(-0.85) (-0.72) (-0.76) (-0.93)
Agricultural sales/farm 0.0000452** 0.0000384* 0.0000419* 0.0000594**
(thousands, 1997) (2.15) (1.86) (1.90) (2.26)
County area (square miles) 0.00000212 0.00000249 0.00000199 0.00000388*
(1.08) (1.28) (1.06) (1.72)
Time index 0.00680 0.00862 0.00653 0.0198
(0.53) (0.66) (0.51) (1.26)
Time index squared -0.00374 -0.00293 -0.00324 -0.00520
(-1.33) (-1.09) (-1.11) (-1.61)
Time index cubed 0.000314* 0.000256 0.000281 0.000390**
(1.86) (1.60) (1.58) (2.03)
Constant -0.120*** -0.105*** -0.116*** -0.139***
(-5.06) (-4.75) (-4.52) (-4.19)
Observations 19910 19910 19910 19909
Test for valid instruments (p-value) 0.8707 0.9883 0.8988 0.3939
Instruments: State lower house ratio Democrats/ Republicans, state upper house ratio Democrats/ Republicans,
House Democrats/ Republicans, Senate Democrats/ Republicans, percentage House representatives voting for
Waxman/Markey Climate Bill, marginal damages of SO2 pollution by state.
Additional instruments for lag log capacity additions (column 4) are the lag state upper and lower house ratio of
Democrats/Republicans, lag electricity price, lag RTO regulated grid, and lag federal production tax credit.
*** Significant at 1 percent level, ** Significant at 5 percent level, * Significant at 10 percent level
Z-statistics in parentheses. Shaded cells indicate instrumented variables.
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Chapter 3
Renewable Power Effects on Electricity Transmission Congestion and
Emissions
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of renewable power plant location on electricity trans-
mission congestion levels and system-wide emissions levels in a theoretical model
and a simulation study. A new renewable plant takes the effect of congestion on
its own output into account, but ignores the effect of its marginal contribution to
congestion on output from existing plants, which results in curtailment of renew-
able power. A model is developed to examine this externality and shows that a
social planner installs smaller sized power plants to minimize curtailment than in-
dividual profit-maximizing firms would. The model also examines the interaction of
the congestion and emissions externalities. In the absence of a price on emissions,
pricing congestion usually reduces system-wide emissions, though there are excep-
tions. Power flow simulations using the modified IEEE 30 bus test system reveal
that clustering of renewable plants contributes to transmission congestion, and that
new renewable plants can affect output at existing plants. Regional energy subsidies
that incentivize the clustering of renewable plants in particular areas are rendered
less effective, since they contribute to renewable power curtailment.




The United States (US) government has various policies in place, both at the
federal and state level, that promote the production of electricity using renewable
energy sources, in order to mitigate climate change and promote energy security.
While the US possesses an abundance of renewable energy sources, such as wind,
solar, and geothermal, renewable power plants are not necessarily deployed in areas
with high renewable energy potential, in part due to differences across states in the
types of incentives offered [45].
The patchwork of state incentives for renewable power contributes to a sub-
optimal distribution of renewable power plants across the electricity transmission
grid in terms of optimal use of both renewable energy and transmission resources.
Renewable power plants cluster in areas that offer the most generous portfolio of
government incentives, which can lead to transmission congestion. During very
windy or sunny periods, the joint power output of renewable plants can exceed
the capacities of transmission lines that connect the plants with electricity demand
centers. Congestion manifests itself as curtailment of power from all producers that
are not granted access to a congested line by the grid operator to maintain grid
stability.
A congestion pricing mechanism is in effect in only some parts of the US
electricity grid to allow for efficient transmission capacity allocation among power
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producers.1 With their zero fuel costs, renewable power plants can underbid con-
ventional power plants for access to a congested line. Renewable power plants are
thus affected by transmission congestion only in areas with a high concentration of
renewable power plants. Congestion pricing acts as a signal to reduce curtailment
by dis-incentivizing clustering of plants.
When curtailment at renewable power plants is reduced, system-wide emissions
are expected to decrease in tandem with the reduction in output at conventional
power plants. However, this result does not hold uniformly and depends on the
configuration of the grid and the substitution patterns between output from renew-
able and conventional power plants. This paper attempts to analyze the connection
between the congestion and emissions externalities. Understanding how renewable
power plants affect and are affected by congestion and how the congestion and
emissions externalities interact is vital to mitigating climate change in an efficient
manner. As the US seeks to increase renewable power capacity in the long run,
these questions will become more important.
The literature on the integration of renewable power plants into the transmis-
sion grid is focused mainly on the issue of intermittency [46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51]. As
opposed to conventional plants, renewable power plants are unable to predict and
accurately control output, since they rely on nature to provide wind or solar energy
as a fuel source. Intermittency at the hourly and sub-hourly level must be balanced
with other fast-ramping power plants - usually natural gas plants.
1The US is a leader in this regard, since power markets are still operated under a single price of
electricity rather than location-dependent pricing in much of the rest of the world, including most
notably Europe.
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Less attention has been given to the relationship between transmission con-
gestion and renewable power generation, though several recent studies focus on the
issue. Førsund et al. (2008) examine how phasing in wind power in Norway affects
transmission congestion and crowding-out of hydropower [52]. Woo et al. (2011)
show that high wind generation and low electricity demand in the Electric Reliabil-
ity Council of Texas (ERCOT) West Zone lead to congestion and zonal electricity
price differences [53]. Phillips and Middleton (2012) develop an optimization model
for the geospatial arrangement and cost minimization of wind power generation and
transmission infrastructure [54]. They find that the costs of integrating a certain
amount of wind in the ERCOT electricity grid can be reduced by up to 50% by
jointly optimizing investment in wind plants and transmission capacity. Blumsack
and Xu (2011) analyze the emissions impacts of incremental investments in wind
power in the Western US using a generation dispatch model that incorporates the
impacts of transmission constraints [55]. They find that the location of wind plants
changes the utilization of transmission assets, which affects system-level emissions,
with wind investment in some locations leading to slight increases in overall emis-
sions. Finally, a study for the Austrialian Clean Energy Council (2010) compares
the costs of achieving 20% wind power penetration levels by 2020 for different ar-
rangements of wind power plants across the grid, and finds that costs are highest
for scenarios with highly concentrated wind power development, requiring significant
investment in transmission capacity [56].
None of the studies investigates the theory or empirics of how the transmis-
sion congestion externality affects renewable power output and the level of emissions,
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and only a few of them offer recommendations for policy improvements. This paper
aims to fill that void. First, the paper develops a theoretical model of the transmis-
sion congestion externality problem, capable of analyzing how state-level subsidies
exacerbate the congestion externality problem by contributing to the clustering of
renewable power plants in certain areas of the grid. Second, the paper demonstrates
the effect of the transmission congestion externality on power plant output through a
series of simulations of power flow in an electricity grid for different levels of electric-
ity demand and wind speed. Both the theoretical model and the simulation study
show that total renewable power output is higher when renewable power plants are
more evenly distributed across potential sites in the grid. In the absence of a price on
emissions, instituting a congestion price will usually reduce system-wide emissions,
though this result depends crucially on the distribution of abatement potential and
the potential to cause congestion across locations.
An optimal government policy would be a uniform carbon price to address the
pollution externality in conjunction with a congestion price to address the congestion
externality. In the absence of a national carbon price, renewable energy subsidies
represent a sub-optimal solution to the pollution externality. Current incentives
can be improved by addressing the effect of the subsidies on congestion levels and
the effect of congestion levels on emissions reductions. The goal of the paper is
to highlight how ignoring the effect of congestion on renewable power output and
emissions levels renders government incentives for renewable power less effective.
The paper first defines the relationship between electricity transmission con-
gestion and renewable power plant location in Section 3.2. A theoretical model ex-
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amining the transmission congestion externality is developed in Section 3.3. Power
output for conventional and wind plants for different levels of electricity demand
and wind speed are simulated in Section 3.4. After a discussion of possible policy
responses in Section 3.5, the paper concludes with Section 3.6.
3.2 Transmission Congestion and Renewable Power Plant Location
3.2.1 Electricity Transmission Congestion
Congestion occurs when power flow over a transmission line exceeds line ca-
pacity, leading to higher local marginal electricity prices in the electricity demand
center, since more electricity must be supplied by local generators rather than less
expensive, distant generators. Expanding line capacity does not remove the con-
gestion externality and only temporarily eases congestion, since the expanded line
capacity may induce other developers to invest in the area.
In the remainder of the paper, wind power will be used as the main example
of renewable power plants, but the results apply to solar power plants as well. Both
types of plants do not have complete control over output and must rely on nature
to supply adequate amounts of fuel to produce power. Thus, for the purpose of
analyzing the transmission congestion and emissions externalities, the term wind
power plant will be used essentially interchangeably with the term renewable power
plant.
Wind power plants are more susceptible to transmission congestion than con-
ventional power plants for two reasons. First, wind power must be transported over
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greater distances to meet sufficient demand, since it is typically windy at night when
electricity demand is low.2 Second, conventional power plants are better connected
with demand centers. This is because many conventional power plants, such as coal
and nuclear plants, were built in the 1950s in tandem with the transmission grid.
The grid connects coal reserves in the Appalachians with demand centers along the
East Coast, but does a poorer job at connecting windy areas in the Midwest with
large cities. Table B.1 in the Appendix shows the average transmission line coverage
around the plant for different plant types, with wind plants locating in areas with
the lowest coverage. For these two reasons, wind power is transmitted over long
distances, which makes it more susceptible to congestion problems.
Transmission congestion is similar to road traffic congestion. As electricity flow
over the line increases, more and more electrical energy is dissipated as heat, which is
produced by the current I flowing through the line resistance R.3 While transmission
congestion results in electricity flow losses, road traffic congestion results in longer
travel times. Without intervention of the grid operator, electricity flow that exceeds
the line’s capacity would result in the line overheating and flow stopping completely.
Grid operators intervene to ensure electricity flow does not exceed some limit. Thus,
the share of output from a power plant that reaches customers at the other end of
the line gradually decreases due to losses and eventually plateaus due to intervention
of the grid operator restricting flow to some limit.
Currently, congestion pricing is in effect in only some parts of the US electricity
2In contrast, solar power output tends to be positively correlated with electricity demand.
3Losses are equal to I2R
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grid.4 Transmission systems are able to price congestion, if they operate based on
locational marginal prices (LMPs), i.e. prices that are determined for each node
rather than a single price for the entire grid. Without transmission congestion, the
price of electricity is the same across all nodes of the grid. When congestion occurs,
the price of meeting an additional MW of demand at one end of the line is higher
than at the other.
As an essentially zero marginal cost plant, wind plants can underbid most
conventional power plants that have non-zero fuel costs. In competing for access
to a congested line, wind plants thus compete with other wind plants and slow-
ramping plants, such as coal, that are unable to ramp down fast enough once wind
speed picks up. Since wind plants earn a federal production tax credit for every unit
of electricity produced, LMPs can be negative (up to negative the production tax
credit).
3.2.2 Renewable Power Plant Location and Congestion
When deciding on optimal plant location, wind power developers take several
factors into account, including the area windiness, distance to the electricity grid,
available state incentives, as well as expected power output given current and future
transmission constraints. Once the wind power plant is built, power output depends
on wind speed and transmission congestion levels, but the wind plant cannot be
relocated if congestion levels prove too high. The presence of a congestion externality
4These include the grids operated by the regional transmission organizations California ISO,
Midwest ISO, PJM, New York ISO, and New England ISO.
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means that developers take into account the average cost of transmission congestion
in siting their wind plants but disregard their marginal impact on output from
existing wind plants.
The portfolio of renewable energy incentives offered by state governments
varies widely from state to state, which can lead to a potentially inefficient allocation
of wind plants across the US in terms of optimal use of both wind and transmission
resources [45]. Wind power plants are clustered in the McCarney region of western
Texas. About 84% of installed wind power capacity is located in the West zone of
ERCOT [57]. On windy days, transmission constraints become an issue. Electricity
prices can drop below zero with wind power plants bidding up to the negative of
the federal production tax credit, in order to gain access to congestion transmis-
sion lines. This was true on June 19, 2012, when record wind generation occurred.
Figure 3.1 shows the total wind generation and settlement prices for four zones in
ERCOT at 15 minute intervals throughout the day of June 19, 2012.
3.2.3 Evidence of Wind Power Curtailment
Grid operators can resort to wind power curtailment in the event of transmis-
sion constraints. In 2009, Midwest ISO curtailed about 200,000 MWh of wind power
or 1% of wind generation [58]. Curtailment as a percentage of potential wind power
output in ERCOT was much higher. In 2009, ERCOT curtailed 3,842,000 MWh,
which amounts to 16% of potential wind power generation, with monthly averages
ranging from 24-28% of potential wind generation from February-April, to about
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Figure 3.1: Electricity Prices and Wind Generation in ERCOT on June 19, 2012
Electricity prices in the West zone, which hosts 84% of wind power capacity in
ERCOT, dropped below zero from 2:45 to 5:15am on June 19, 2012, a particularly
windy day. Wind generation remained high throughout the day, but congestion
eased somewhat as electricity demand in the West zone increased. In the absence
of congestion, prices in all four zones would be the same.
10-18% in January and from May-November and 6% in December [58, 59].
Curtailment is a much larger issue in ERCOT due to several factors (Table 3.1).
First, ERCOT produces a larger share of its electricity from wind than Midwest ISO,
with the shares amounting to 6.2% and 2.9% in 2009, respectively [60, 61].5 Second,
the degree of wind power plant concentration is slightly higher in ERCOT than in
Midwest ISO. In 2009, about 87% of wind capacity was located in ERCOT’s West
zone. In Midwest ISO, 84% of wind power capacity was installed in the Western
5In 2012, ERCOT and Midwest ISO generated 9.2% and 8.2% (in the Fall), respectively, from
wind.
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Table 3.1: Wind Power Capacity, Output, and Curtailment in ERCOT and Midwest
ISO
ERCOT Midwest ISO
Wind power curtailment (MWh) 3,842,000 200,000
Wind power curtailment (% of potential output) 16 1
Installed wind capacity (%) 11 5.1
Electricity generated from wind (%) 6.2 2.9
Installed wind capacity located in West (%) 87 84
Installed wind capacity (% of total capacity in West) 62 20
Load in West (%) 7.4 22.7
Source: [60, 59, 61, 58]
region. Third and most importantly, the imbalance between installed wind power
capacity and load (electricity demand) in ERCOT’s West zone was much larger
than in Midwest ISO’s Western region. In ERCOT, 62% of generating capacity in
the West zone was wind, but only 7.4% of load was located in the West [59]. In
Midwest ISO, 20% of generating capacity in the West was wind, and 22.7% of load
was located in the West [61]. Thus, a much greater share of electricity produced
by wind power plants had to be exported in ERCOT than in Midwest ISO, making
wind power in ERCOT more susceptible to transmission congestion. This explains
why a much larger share of wind power was curtailed in ERCOT (16%) than in
Midwest ISO (1%).
Wind plants in Midwest ISO may have much greater abatement potential than
wind plants in ERCOT, since coal plants generated 74% of electricity in Midwest ISO
in 2009, compared with 37% in ERCOT. Natural gas and nuclear plants contributed
42% and 14% to electricity generated in ERCOT. System-wide emissions rates in
ERCOT are thus lower than in Midwest ISO, since coal plants have the highest
emissions rates. Thus, while the amount of wind power curtailment in ERCOT is
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higher than in Midwest ISO, the difference in terms of emissions abatement potential
may be lower. The cost of curtailment in Midwest ISO is high due to the high system-
wide emissions rate. In Minnesota, as the portion of electricity generated by wind
grew from 4% to 10% from 2006 to 2009, electric sector carbon-dioxide emissions
fell by more than 10%, or 4 million tons [62].
3.3 Model
The model developed in this section examines how individual wind power plant
location affects output at other wind power plants by contributing to electricity
transmission congestion. Individual firms acting independently to maximize profits
do not address this externality, but a social planner who maximizes profits across
all wind plants does. The optimal congestion charge is derived that would induce
individual firms to choose the socially optimal amount of capacity to install at
each location. A regional renewable energy subsidy is found to exacerbate the
congestion externality by contributing to clustering of wind plants in certain areas
of the grid. Finally, the effect on system-wide emissions of instituting a congestion
price is examined.
3.3.1 Model Setup and Assumptions
Assume there are n potential wind plant sites within a stylized electricity grid,
to which conventional fossil fueled generators are connected. It is assumed that each
wind plant is owned by a different firm. Wind power output is a function of wind
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speed, total load, installed capacity, congestion, and location. Congestion, as it
affects wind plants, depends on total wind power output and is independent of con-
ventional power output, since wind power plants can always underbid conventional
power plants. Thus, competition among wind power plants for transmission capacity
affects wind power output.
Several simplifying assumptions are made. First, the levelized marginal invest-
ment cost c for each unit of capacity ki is assumed to be constant with 0 < c < 1.
6
Second, load and wind speed are assumed to remain constant, which means that,
without congestion, electricity generation would depend only on installed capacity.
Third, the price of electricity for the given load level is set to one.
A developer building a new wind plant does not take into account the effect of
building its new plant on output of existing wind plants, resulting in idle capacity
at existing wind plants. A social planner would build a smaller or potentially no
plant at that location, in order to reduce congestion and minimize the amount of
idle capacity.
Electricity output from a wind plant is modeled as the fraction of utilized
capacity multiplied by installed capacity. The fraction of capacity used to produce
electricity can be described by fi(k1, . . . , kn), where 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 and ki is the installed
capacity at location i. If there is no transmission congestion, fi = 1 and installed
capacity at location i is fully utilized to produce the electricity output fi · ki. Since
the price of electricity is normalized to one, the total value of capacity (1 · fi · ki) is
6The levelized marginal investment cost is based on an assumed utilization rate, which depends
on transmission congestion. In this model, the cost c is not updated once investment is made and
transmission congestion is realized.
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the same as total electricity output (fi · ki).
Since installed capacities at other locations j 6= i affect output at location i,
fi(·) is a function of k1, . . . , kn. The installed capacities ki and kj have a differ-
ent effect on the fraction of utilized capacity at other locations, since transmission
congestion depends on the grid configuration. How output of a wind plant affects
output at other plants depends on how electricity flows through the grid. For this
reason, the fraction of utilized capacity is indexed by i.
At low levels of capacity ki, the wind plant at location i can operate at full
capacity and fi = 1. As the transmission lines heat up, the fraction of output
produced that can be sold to customers is reduced, since electrical energy dissipates
as heat.7 Eventually, line capacity is reached, and additional units of wind power




Initially, low levels of capacity kj may not affect output of the plant at location
i. The plants at both locations i and j are trying to access the same line, but the
plant at location j has better access to the line. As kj increases, output at location
i goes to zero. Once output from location j has completely displaced output from
location i, the line capacity constraint becomes binding for the plant at location j.
The negative congestion externality is reflected in ∂fi/∂kj ≤ 0, ∂2fi/∂k2j ≤ 0. It is
assumed that ∂2fi/∂ki∂kj ≤ 0, i.e. the effect of ki on fi decreases with increasing
levels of kj.
7In practice, a plant’s price bid is multiplied by a loss factor, depending on how output from the
plant contributes to system losses. A loss factor greater than 1 means that the plant contributes
to losses.
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Firms maximize profits disregarding the effect of their own wind plant output
on output from existing plants through congestion. The social planner takes this
externality into account and maximizes profits for all firms. Initially, the benefits
in terms of emissions reductions of wind power plants are not incorporated into
the model, such that the resulting overall level of installed wind power capacity
does not necessarily induce the socially optimal level of emissions reductions. In
this simplified model, comparisons between the distribution of wind plants induced
by profit-maximizing firms and a social planner are still possible, and any results
derived from these comparisons are independent of whether or not total installed
capacity is optimal in terms of emissions reductions.
3.3.2 Modeling the Transmission Congestion Externality
The following analysis shows that a social planner installs smaller wind plants
than individual profit-maximizing firms would. Only if the grid is uncongested are
the installed capacities in the social planner problem equal to those in the firm
problem.
Firm Problem
Since installed capacity ki at each location i is common knowledge, and firms
are assumed to profit-maximize taking other firms’ strategies as given, the solution
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to the firm problem is a Nash Equilibrium. Firms maximize
max
ki
fi(k1, . . . , kn)ki − cki
Let k∗i denote the level of capacity that satisfies the first order condition:
fi(k
∗







(k∗1, . . . , k
∗
n)− c = 0. (3.1)
The Nash equilibrium level of capacity at location i is implicitly given by
k∗i =
c− fi(k∗1, . . . , k∗n)
∂fi
∂ki











(fi(k1, . . . , kn)ki − cki) .
Let ksi denote the socially optimal level of capacity at location i that satisfies the
ith first order condition:
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n) · ksi − c = 0. (3.2)
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The socially optimal level of capacity at location i is implicitly given by
ksi =
















Comparing the Nash equilibrium condition given by equation 3.1 with the





kj = 0 for all i. The term
∑
j 6=i(∂fi/∂kj) · kj captures the congestion externality.
Only in the absence of a congestion externality is the Nash equilibrium equal to the
social optimum.
Since (∂fj/∂ki) ≤ 0 and kj ≥ 0, the congestion externality term can only
equal zero if all partial derivatives are equal to zero or if nonzero, the corresponding
kj is equal to zero. Thus, if the amount of wind capacities installed at locations
i = 1, . . . , n are small compared with load and line capacity, then it may indeed be
true that (∂fj/∂ki) = 0 for all j 6= i, i.e. there is no congestion. In this case, the
Nash equilibrium level of capacity at all locations is the same as the social optimum
and k∗i = k
s
i for all i. If, however, the grid configuration is such that line capacity
presents a real constraint to wind power output, i.e. there is potential for congestion,
then (∂fj/∂ki) < 0 and kj > 0 for some i 6= j. In this case, firms acting individually
would not achieve the social optimum and k∗i > k
s
i . In general, k
s
i ≤ k∗i for all i.
The proof is in Section B.1 in the Appendix.
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3.3.3 Optimal Congestion Charge
Suppose firms are held responsible for congestion they cause that results in
reductions in output at other wind plants. An optimal congestion charge would be
set in such a way that profit-maximizing firms achieve the socially optimal level of
installed capacity at each of the i = 1, . . . , n locations.
Firm Problem
Firms must pay a congestion charge ti per unit of installed capacity ki.
max
ki
fi(k1, . . . , kn)ki − tiki − cki
Let kti denote the level of capacity that satisfies the first order condition:
fi(k
t







(kt1, . . . , k
t
n)− ti − c = 0. (3.3)
Comparing equation 3.3 with equation 3.2, it follows that the optimal congestion







(kt1, . . . , k
t
n).
Since ∂fj/∂ki ≤ 0, the congestion charge ti is greater or equal to zero. The
optimal congestion charge is equal to the sum of marginal damages from congestion
induced by the wind plant at location i. The charge allows the wind plant at location
i to fully internalize the effect of its output on output from all other wind plants.
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3.3.4 Regional Renewable Energy Subsidy
Suppose an energy subsidy were offered in a region based on the amount
of capacity installed. Depending on the size of the subsidy, this can represent a
significant draw to a particular region.
Assume that the electricity grid stretches over several jurisdictions, and that
Region A offers an energy subsidy of size r. Region A is defined as containing all
locations i ∈ IA ⊂ I = {1, . . . , n}. The subsidy at location i is thus defined as
ri =

r if i ∈ IA




fi(k1, . . . , kn)ki + (ri − c)ki
Let kri denote the level of capacity that satisfies the first order condition:
fi(k
r







(kr1, . . . , k
r
n) + ri − c = 0. (3.4)
The subsidy is an incentive for increased investment in wind power in Region
A. Comparing equations 3.4 and 3.1, it follows that kri > k
∗
i for all i ∈ IA and
krj = k
∗
j for all j /∈ IA. The proof is in Section B.1 in the Appendix.
Congestion induced by regional renewable energy subsidies prevents wind
power capacity from being fully utilized. If the subsidy is capacity-based, as in
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the example above, then part of the subsidy is wasted. The same holds true for
production-based subsidies, since electricity production from wind plants displaces
production from other wind plants rather than conventional plants.
3.3.5 How Congestion Affects Emissions Reductions by Renewable
Power Plants
This section investigates the interaction of the congestion and emissions exter-
nalities. The main question is whether the institution of a congestion charge reduces
or increases system-wide emissions in the absence of a price on emissions, such as
carbon dioxide.
Suppose an abatement-specific production incentive ai were offered for wind
power. The subsidy amount varies across wind plant locations according to the
amount of emissions reductions achieved at conventional power plants for a given
grid configuration and load level. The subsidy reduces the price per kWh of wind
power relative to conventional power. In terms of the amount of investment in wind
capacity, this subsidy is equivalent to pricing pollution at conventional power plants,
since that increases the price per kWh of conventional power relative to wind power.
The abatement-specific production incentive ai is given exogenously and is
defined to induce optimal levels of abatement given the costs of wind power and the
benefits of reducing emissions. However, the optimality of ai depends on congestion
levels, since a wind power plant may substitute for different sets of conventional
power plants (with different emissions rates) when there is congestion than when the
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grid is uncongested. If (a1, . . . , an) is defined as optimal in the uncongested grid, then
ai achieves only second-best levels of abatement if the grid is congested. Optimality
would require jointly determining ai and ki taking congestion into account, which is
beyond the scope of this paper. This model is meant to provide a first illustration
of how the congestion and emissions externalities interact.
This model makes the simplifying assumption that congestion alters the level
of output of wind plants (quantity effect) but does not alter which conventional
plants the wind plants displaces (quality effect). With this assumption, abatement
potential does not depend on congestion levels and (a1, . . . , an) induces optimal
abatement regardless of congestion levels.
Firm Problem: Abatement-Specific Production Incentive
Suppose the government offers a production incentive that is location-specific,
such that the firm receives ai = 1 + subsidyi > 1 per unit of output. The subsidy
is a function of the emissions reductions at conventional power plants achieved by




aifi(k1, . . . , kn)ki − cki.
Let kai denote the level of capacity that satisfies the first order condition:
aifi(k
a







(ka1 , . . . , k
a
n)− c = 0. (3.5)
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Social Planner Problem: Abatement-Specific Production Incentive






(aifi(k1, . . . , kn)ki − cki) .
Let ksai denote the socially optimal level of capacity at location i that satisfies the
ith first order condition:
aifi(k
sa










(ksa1 , . . . , k
sa
n )− c = 0. (3.6)




















The set of installed capacities (ksa1 , . . . , k
sa
n ) represents the socially optimal level
in terms of managing both the congestion and emissions externalities.8 Subsidizing
wind power according to each plant’s potential to reduce emissions at conventional
plants is equivalent to pricing emissions at the conventional plants, since in both
8Abatement would be suboptimal without the simplifying assumption that the per-unit abate-
ment potential of wind plants is independent of congestion (i.e. the types of conventional plants
the wind plant substitutes for does not change with changes in congestion levels).
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cases the relative production costs of the wind and conventional plants are realigned.
Again, kai = k
sa
i for all i only if the grid is uncongested. In general, k
a
i ≥ ksai
for all i. The proof is analogous to the proof that k∗i ≥ ksi in Section B.1.
Subsidizing wind power according to its abatement potential changes the
weights the social planner puts on output from plant i as compared with output
from other plants j 6= i. As compared with ksi , the per-unit cost of the wind plant
at location i is reduced by the factor 1/ai, and the congestion externality term is
scaled by aj/ai. The social planner is thus capable of capturing any trade-offs be-
tween congestion and abatement. For example, if the plant at location i causes
large amounts of congestion but has high abatement potential, then one would ex-
pect ksai > k
s
i .
3.3.5.1 Pricing Congestion in the Absence of a Price on Emissions
When wind power is not subsidized according to its abatement potential,
how the institution of a congestion pricing mechanism would change system-wide
emissions depends on the configuration of the grid. With an optimal congestion
charge (ignoring the location-specific abatement potential of wind plants), profit-
maximizing firms choose the socially optimal level of capacity, i.e. kti = k
s
i for all i.
The institution of a congestion charge results in capacity (and thus output) being
reduced at some locations to ease congestion and to increase output at other loca-
tions. How this distribution of increases and decreases in output compares with the
distribution of abatement potential across locations depends on the configuration of
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the grid in question. Thus, how the institution of a congestion charge would change
system-wide emissions is uncertain. However, it is possible to draw some general
conclusions from the model.
Suppose ai is close to 1 and aj = ā >> 1 for all j 6= i, i.e. the abatement
potential of location i is very small relative to other locations and the distribution
of abatement potential is skewed to the left. If location i causes non-zero congestion
externalities, then instituting a congestion charge would lead to a reduction in output
at location i in favor of an increase in output at other locations j 6= i. Since i has
low abatement potential relative to locations j 6= i, the institution of a congestion
charge would lead to a reduction in system-wide emissions.
Suppose ai >> ā = aj ≈ 1 for all j 6= i, i.e. the abatement potential of
location i is very large relative to other locations and the distribution of abatement
potential is skewed to the right. If location i causes large congestion externalities,
then instituting a congestion charge would lead to a large reduction in output at
location i in favor of a large increase in output at all other locations j 6= i. Since i
has high abatement potential relative to other locations, the effect on system-wide
emissions is uncertain. It is clear that total wind power output increases under a
congestion charge. However, the abatement increase achieved through the increase
in output from low-abatement locations j may not be sufficient to make up for the
large abatement decrease due to the large reduction in output from high-abatement
location i. In this case, system-wide emissions may increase.
If location i causes small congestion externalities, then a congestion charge
would result in a small reduction in output at location i in favor of an increase in
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Table 3.2: Congestion Charge Effect on Emissions
Abatement Congestion Effect of System-wide
potential of i potential of i congestion charge emissions
Relatively low > 0 ⇒ ki ↓ Down
output−i ↑
Relatively high High ⇒ ki ↓↓ ? Likely up
output−i ↑↑
Low ⇒ ki ↓ ? Likely down
output−i ↑
output at all other locations. Since total wind output increases under a congestion
charge, it is likely that the total abatement resulting from the increases in output
at locations j 6= i is sufficient to make up for the reduction in abatement at location
i. In this case, system-wide emissions decrease. Table 3.2 summarizes these results.
In general, if abatement potential and the potential to cause congestion are
negatively correlated, pricing congestion would likely reduce system-wide emissions.
If the correlation is positive and both distributions are skewed to the right, pricing
congestion could increase system-wide emissions. If the correlation is positive and
both distributions are skewed to the left, pricing congestion would likely reduce
system-wide emissions. In general, pricing congestion should reduce system-wide
emissions, since it leads to an increase in overall output from wind plants, unless
abatement potential and the potential to cause congestion are positively correlated
and both distributions are skewed to the right.
It is important to note that pricing congestion will not always reduce system-
wide emissions. In order to address both the congestion and emissions externalities,
two instruments are needed - a congestion price and an emissions price.
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3.4 Simulation: Wind Power Plants in the IEEE 30 Bus Test System
The following simulation study examines how the location decisions of wind
power developers can affect congestion levels and electricity output at existing wind
power plants. A new wind plant connecting to a grid is found to reduce output at ex-
isting plants, if they are induced to cluster in one area offering a regional renewable
energy subsidy. The same number of wind plants installed at different, more dis-
tributed locations across the grid does not result in a reduction in utilized capacity
through congestion. The size of the reduction in emissions achieved through wind
power depends on the emissions rates of the conventional power plants. Different
configurations of wind power plants across the grid result in different reductions in
emissions.
3.4.1 Modified IEEE 30 Bus Test System
This paper uses a standard power flow test case - the modified IEEE 30 bus
test system,9 representing a portion of the American Electric Power system in the
Midwest in 1961 [63]. The original 30 bus test system was first used by Alsac and
Stott in 1974 [64] and later entered in IEEE Common Data Format by Rich Christie
in 1993 [63]. The modified IEEE 30 bus test system is based on [64].10 In addition,
generator locations, costs and limits and bus areas are from [65]. This modified
IEEE 30 bus test system is used widely in power flow analysis. Figure 3.2 shows
the configuration of the IEEE 30 bus test system.
9IEEE stands for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
10Branch parameters rounded to nearest 0.01, shunt values divided by 100 and the shunt on bus
10 moved to bus 5
66
The IEEE 30 bus system consists of 30 buses (nodes), 41 branches (transmis-
sion lines), 6 generators, and 21 loads (demand centers). It is divided into three
areas, which are interpreted as three states offering different renewable energy in-
centives. The bus data including the load for real and reactive power11 are given
in Table B.2 in the Appendix. The largest load (94.2 MW) is at bus 5 in Area A.
The total generating capacity of the grid is 335 MW, while load is 283.4 MW. Table
B.3 shows generator capacity limits and operating costs, which are assumed to be








each of the i = 1, . . . , 6 generators. At most capacity levels the generators in Area A
are the least costly, while those in Area C are the most expensive. The transmission
line capacity limits are given in Table B.4.
The capacities of the generators in the modified IEEE 30 bus test system range
from 35 to 80 MW, which is small compared with the 500 to 2,000 MW capacity
range of most fossil-fueled power plants. However, the test system is consistent
within itself. Multiplying generator capacities and bus loads by some factor, while
proportionally increasing line capacities, does not change the dispatch order. Simi-
larly, while 30 distribution buses will cover only a small area, the 30 bus test system
can also represent 30 transmission buses in a large region, where smaller connections
between the buses are ignored. For these reasons, the IEEE 30 bus test system can
be applied to the case of wind plants locating within a regional transmission grid
11When a coil or capacitor is connected to an alternating current (AC) power supply, it stores
electrical energy during a quarter of an AC cycle and releases it back into the AC power supply
in the next quarter phase. Though there is no net energy flow over one complete AC cycle, the
back and forth flow of energy in each quarter cycle, called reactive power, heats up the wires, and
is thus regarded by grid operators as a load.
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that covers parts of three different states, represented by Areas A, B, and C.
3.4.2 Optimal Power Flow
To determine which generators are dispatched to meet the electricity load,
the optimal power flow (OPF) is solved with the Matlab package MATPOWER
developed by [66]. The OPF describes how to meet electricity demand at least
cost while satisfying the physical constraints of the grid. The cost minimization
objective function and constraints are presented in Section B.2 in the Appendix.
The constraints include that supply equals demand at each bus and that the branch
flow limits are not exceeded.
The optimal power flow in the baseline case of the modified IEEE 30 bus test
system is depicted in Figure 3.2. The generators at buses 2 and 27 are operating at
full capacity, and the branches from buses 21 to 22 and 15 to 23 are congested. The
LMP ranges from 4.30 $/MWh at bus 23 to 5.02 $/MWh at bus 5. The objective
function value, i.e. the total cost of producing electricity to meet demand, is 982.51
$/hour.
3.4.3 Simulation: Wind Plants Connect to the Grid
Area C is now assumed to provide a renewable energy subsidy. Three wind
plants connect to the grid, and all are induced to locate in Area C due to the incen-
tive. The wind plants at buses 24 and 25 have 21 MW capacity and the wind plant at
bus 29 has 30 MW capacity. Due to the zero marginal operating costs, a wind plant
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Figure 3.2: Optimal Power Flow in the Baseline Case
Highlighted generators and branches are operating at capacity.
will always be able to underbid one of the other conventional power plants, which
have positive marginal operating costs. Wind power will be curtailed only when
power cannot be transported to demand centers due to transmission congestion. In
the OPF, the wind power plants operate at full or near-full capacity (column 2 of
Table 3.3), though 6 branches are congested as compared with 2 branches in the
baseline no-wind case (Table 3.4).
Next, a fourth wind plant with 30 MW capacity is added to the grid in Area C
at bus 30. In the OPF, it operates at full 30 MW capacity, but the wind plant at bus
29 operates at only 13.51 MW capacity, while it was previously operating at full 30
MW capacity (column 3 of Table 3.3). This demonstrates the case of a congestion
externality. The developer of the plant at bus 30 does not take into account the
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Table 3.3: Optimal Power Flow Results in High Wind Speed Case: Generator Out-
put (MWh)
Bus Number Baseline Three Wind Four Wind Plants
(Capacity) Plants (clustered) (clustered) (unclustered)
Conventional Bus 1 (80 MW) 64.70 71.66 68.52 45.96
plants Bus 2 (80 MW) 80.00 80.00 80.00 61.03
Bus 22 (50 MW) 28.93 26.48 26.52 23.43
Bus 27 (55 MW) 55.00 7.65 0.00 22.41
Bus 23 (30 MW) 26.02 0.00 0.00 16.81
Bus 13 (40 MW) 35.33 34.67 35.21 17.38
Total 289.98 220.45 210.26 187.02
Wind plants Bus 24 (21 MW) 0.00 20.09 19.75 21.00 (Bus 7, 21 MW)
Bus 25 (21 MW) 0.00 21.00 18.32 21.00 (Bus 28, 21 MW)
Bus 29 (30 MW) 0.00 30.00 13.52 30.00 (Bus 16, 30 MW)
Bus 30 (30 MW) 0.00 0.00 30.00 30.00 (Bus 30, 30 MW)
Total 0.00 71.09 81.60 102.00
Total cost ($/hr) 982.51 727.70 690.07 558.11
Table 3.4: Optimal Power Flow Results in High Wind Speed Case: Branch Con-
straint Shadow Prices
From bus To bus Baseline Three Wind Four Wind Plants
Plants (clustered) (clustered) (unclustered)
6 8 0 9.70 11.86 0
16 17 0 0 0 0.16
21 22 0.22 4.96 5.59 0
15 23 0.50 0 0 0
22 24 0 7.30 7.86 0
23 24 0 0.26 0.32 0
24 25 0 0.79 3.50 0
27 29 0 1.10 2.76 0
6 28 0 0 0 0.24
All other branches are unconstrained with a shadow price equal to zero.
effect of the plant’s power output on congestion levels that affect other wind power
plants - here most significantly the plant at bus 29. The branch constraint shadow
prices (i.e. congestion prices) are presented in Table 3.4. With the addition of
the fourth wind plant at bus 30, congestion increases on all 6 already congested
branches.
Adding a fourth wind plant at bus 30 means that over half of the wind power
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plant capacity at bus 29 remains idle. Of course, output at the conventional power
plants is also affected, notably the plants at buses 23 and 27. Since wind power plants
represent the cheaper alternative, the reduction in output at the more expensive
conventional power plants is beneficial to consumers. The plants at buses 23 and 27
may over time be mothballed or shut down completely.
A different distribution of four wind plants across the potential wind plant
sites results in a different reduction of output for the conventional power plants.
Column 4 of Table 3.3 shows the OPF results for the case where four wind plants
are more uniformly distributed across the grid. Two wind plants of 21 MW capacity
connect to buses 7 and 28 in Area A, which is where the greatest electricity demand
is located, and two wind plants of 30 MW capacity connect to buses 16 and 30 in
Areas B and C, respectively. All four plants operate at full capacity, as opposed to
the case of clustered plants presented in column 3 of Table 3.3. The conventional
power plants produce 210.25 MWh and 187.02 MWh in a given hour in the clustered
and unclustered case, respectively.
If all conventional power plants had the same emissions rate, the unclustered
case would result in a greater reduction in emissions than the Nash equilibrium case.
If the emissions rates of the plants at buses 23 and 27 were significantly higher than
those of the other plants, it may be the case that the clustered plants case results
in lower total emissions despite the lower wind power output.
While the effect of the distribution of wind power plants across potential sites
on the total emissions produced by the conventional power plants in an hour for a
given level of electricity demand is unclear, it is certain that the distribution induced
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by a social planner would result in greater or equal wind power output than the
distribution induced by individual firms, since the social planner takes congestion
into account. Given that conventional power plants have non-zero emissions, it is
likely that the distribution of wind plants induced by a social planner would result
in lower emissions.
3.4.4 Generator Output for Different Wind Speed and Load Levels
Wind does not blow constantly all the time. In fact, it is usually windy at
night, when electricity demand is low. This is why transmission bottlenecks present
such a problem to wind power plants. When demand is low but wind power plant
output is high, electricity must be transported over greater distances to reach a
sufficient amount of demand. Table 3.5 shows the generator output for different
load levels and wind speeds in the case of four wind plants connected to the grid
in Area C at buses 24, 25, 29, and 30. Four load levels are considered - 25%,
50%, 75%, and 100% of the original load, which occur with 21%, 17%, 38%, and
25% probability. Low, medium, and high wind speeds have a certain probability of
occurring at different load levels. The assumed joint probability of wind speed and
load levels is given in the second row of Table 3.5. High wind speeds are most likely
to occur during hours of low electricity load. This joint distribution is one of many
possible distributions.
Based on the joint probability of wind speed and load level, each column in
Table 3.5 occurs with a certain probability. The expected output of each generator
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is presented in Table 3.6 for the baseline, three wind plants, and four wind plants
scenarios. Expected output for the generator at bus 27 is significantly reduced from
31.46 MWh to 11.96 MWh for a given hour with the addition of four wind plants in
Area C. The addition of a fourth wind plant at bus 30 reduces expected wind plant
output at bus 29 from 17.24 to 13.24 MWh for a given hour due to transmission
congestion. Total expected wind output in the unclustered case is higher than in





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Expected Generator Output for Different Wind Speed and Load Levels
Bus Number Baseline Three Wind Four Wind Plants
(Capacity) Plants (clustered) (clustered) (unclustered)
Conv. Bus 1 (80 MW) 45.11 39.50 37.79 33.40
plants Bus 2 (80 MW) 59.09 52.00 50.21 45.13
Bus 22 (50 MW) 22.92 20.82 20.70 18.23
Bus 27 (55 MW) 31.46 18.68 11.96 19.21
Bus 23 (30 MW) 15.38 9.79 8.85 11.40
Bus 13 (40 MW) 18.33 15.85 15.34 11.98
Total 192.29 156.65 144.85 139.35
Wind Bus 24 (7,14,21 MW) 12.23 11.89 12.35 (Bus 7, 21 MW)
plants Bus 25 (21 MW) 12.60 11.94 12.24 (Bus 28, 21 MW)
Bus 29 (30 MW) 17.24 13.24 17.24 (Bus 16, 30 MW)
Bus 30 (30 MW) 17.36 16.34 (Bus 30, 30 MW)
Total 42.07 54.44 58.17
3.5 Optimal Policy
Wind power curtailment as a result of congestion represents an inefficiency
on two counts. First, government subsidies are partially wasted, since wind power
capacity is not fully utilized. Second, curtailment means that available wind power
is not used to replace production from conventional power plants that produce emis-
sions. This represents a lost opportunity for reducing air pollution.
The point of renewable energy subsidies is to reduce pollution by increasing the
portion of electricity generated through renewable resources. When wind power is
curtailed due to transmission constraints, conventional power plants, which over time
might have shut down in the absence of congestion, remain operational, delaying
the transition to cleaner electricity.
The optimal government policy would be the institution of a carbon price in
conjunction with marginal cost pricing of electricity transmission congestion, such
as exists in some regional transmission organizations today. The carbon price (and
prices or caps on other air pollutants) would ensure that air pollution externali-
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ties are appropriately internalized rather than through the roundabout method of
subsidizing renewable power, disregarding each plant’s contribution to emissions
reductions. Marginal cost congestion pricing across the entire grid would ensure
efficient use of congested lines. With the removal of the air pollution externality
through the carbon price, there is no need to pay special attention to the adverse
effect of congestion on wind power as opposed to conventional power.
In the absence of a national carbon price, congestion pricing usually reduces
system-wide emissions, but this depends crucially on relative abatement potential of
the various affected renewable power plants. In the absence of both a national carbon
price and congestion pricing, the government should take into account the effect
of regional renewable energy subsidies on transmission congestion levels through
clustering of wind plants. It is important to note that congestion pricing alone does
not guarantee a reduction in emissions. Two instruments - a price on congestion and
a price on emissions - are necessary to appropriately deal with the two externalities.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper models the effect of individual renewable power plant location on
total system-wide renewable power output by examining the electricity transmission
congestion externality. The model developed in this paper shows that a social plan-
ner taking the congestion externality into account would build smaller renewable
power plants in areas with an already high penetration of renewable power than
individual firms would, thereby reducing renewable power curtailment. In addition,
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state-level renewable energy subsidies contribute to transmission congestion, since
they induce clustering of wind power plants.
While the location decision of any type of power plant affects output at other
plants, this paper is concerned with renewable power plants in particular, for two
reasons. First, they are more susceptible to transmission congestion than conven-
tional power plants due to constraints in expanding the existing transmission grid
infrastructure. Second, curtailment at renewable power plants results in a reduction
in abatement.
A simulation of optimal power flow in the modified IEEE 30 bus test system
shows that the location of a new renewable power plant affects congestion levels and
output at existing plants. If renewable power plants are drawn to an area through a
renewable energy subsidy, the clustering of plants leads to higher congestion levels
and lower total renewable power output than otherwise. This means that current
state-level subsidies are less effective because of transmission congestion, since part
of the installed renewable power capacity remains idle during congested hours.
Renewable energy subsidies are intended to correct for the lack of price on air
pollution from conventional power plants. The goal is to change the energy mix to
reduce overall air pollution levels. Which type of plant a renewable power plant
substitutes for depends upon the configuration of the electricity grid in question.
Transmission congestion may mean that the dirtiest coal plants continue operating,
while cleaner natural gas plants make way for renewable plants. Renewable power
plant developers do not take into account which types of plants their power will
substitute for given the configuration of the grid. This is why renewable energy
77
subsidies are less efficient at abating emissions than a policy that prices emissions
at conventional plants.
An optimal policy would take the form of a national carbon price to address
the carbon emissions externality in conjunction with congestion pricing across all
areas of the grid. In the absence of a carbon price, system-wide emissions should
usually be reduced by the institution of congestion pricing, though there are notable
exceptions. In the absence of both a carbon price and congestion pricing, state-level
incentives could be improved if they take into account the effect of the incentive




Severe Censoring in the Tobit Model
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of the degree of censoring on random-effects Tobit esti-
mates in finite sample, with a particular focus on severe censoring, when the percent-
age of uncensored observations reaches as low as 1 percent. The Monte Carlo method
is used to analyze the effect of varying the percentage of uncensored observations
from 63 to 1 percent in different sample sizes of N ∈ {1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000}
and T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 8}. The results show that the Tobit model performs well even
at 5 percent uncensored observations with the bias in the estimated coefficients,
standard errors, marginal effects, and disturbance standard deviation remaining at
or below 5 percent for most combinations of T and N . Under severe censoring (1
percent uncensored observations), large biases - mostly under 100 percent - appear
in the estimated standard errors and marginal effects. These are generally reduced
as the sample size increases in both N and T .




In some lines of research, it is quite common for the dependent variable in an
econometric analysis to be severely censored. In marketing, response rates to untar-
geted direct mailings may often only reach 0.5 percent, depending on the product
or service advertised [67]. Similarly, the participation rate in voluntary government
programs, such as for environmental conservation or energy efficiency, can be quite
low. When researchers are faced with a severely censored dependent variable, the
temptation is there to drop the censored observations and focus on the sub-sample of
uncensored observations, because of uncertainty about how the econometric models
for dealing with censored data perform in finite sample. This would be a mistake,
since results from the analysis of the sub-sample of uncensored observations would
not be generalizable to the whole population.
This paper performs a Monte Carlo analysis of the Tobit model in finite sample
to determine the degree of bias in the estimates of the coefficients, standard errors,
disturbance standard deviation, and marginal effects for varying degrees of censor-
ing. Knowledge about the presence or absence of bias in the Tobit estimates should
be useful to applied economists in various fields dealing with severely censored data.
While there is no theoretical reason for the degree of censoring to affect Tobit
estimates asymptotically, it is unclear how the estimates behave in a finite sample
with severe censoring. Literature on the effect of the degree of censoring on the
coefficient estimates is scarce. Greene (2004) [68] investigates the incidental pa-
rameters problem in the fixed effects Tobit model. As part of this study he finds
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that changing the degree of censoring from 20 to 64 percent has little effect on the
coefficient estimates. This study, however, does not look at the case of more severe
censoring. Cramer et al. (1999) [69] analyze the effect of severe censoring (99.5 per-
cent), but their results are not based on generated data. Instead, they use a given
dataset from a bank on the rate of switching from savings to investment accounts
and find that the coefficient estimates do not change dramatically with the degree of
censoring. However, the true value of the coefficient is unknown, as is the direction
of the bias, since some coefficient estimates first increase and then decrease with the
degree of censoring. Neither of these two studies adequately addresses the issue of
severe censoring in the Tobit model in finite sample. This paper aims to fill that
void.
The Monte Carlo study in this paper sheds light on how the maximum like-
lihood estimator of the Tobit model behaves in finite sample when the dependent
variable is severely censored. Several scenarios are analyzed. The percentage of
uncensored observations changes from 1.1 (severe) to 5.1, 16, 37, and 63. The num-
ber of individuals varies from N = 1000 to 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000. Finally,
the cross-sectional case is considered (T = 1) as well as the random-effects panel
cases with T = 2, 3, 5, and 8. In all scenarios, the bias in percent is calculated
for the coefficient estimates, standard errors, marginal effects, and the disturbance
standard deviation.
This paper finds that the Tobit model performs quite well overall even in the
case of more severe censoring. With 5 percent uncensored observations, the Tobit
estimates are largely unbiased for all combinations of T and N considered. With
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only 1 percent uncensored observations, estimates of the marginal effects should be
treated with caution in most cases. Significant bias is present for T = 1, 2, and 3.
Only for T = 5 and N ≥ 3000 as well as T = 8 and N ≥ 2000 is the bias in the
estimates of the marginal effects low. Here, the marginal effects are underestimated
by up to 12 percent, and can thus provide a lower bound on the true effect.
4.2 Tobit Model
A dependent variable is censored if it is continuous but bounded from above
and/or below. The values of the dependent variable outside of the threshold are
unknown and are recorded as equal to the threshold. Censoring in this regard is
the result of data observability. For example, the concentration of air or water
pollutants may be undetectable under a certain threshold as given by the measuring
technology. The pollutant concentration variable is thus censored from below at the
detection threshold.
A similar type of censoring is exhibited in the corner solution model, though it
is not the result of data observability. Here, the dependent variable is the solution to
an optimization problem. It equals the corner solution (usually zero) with positive
probability and is continuous elsewhere. For example, the dependent variable could
measure the optimal amount of investment in renewable power in mega-watts in
county i in period t. For the vast majority of county-time observations, this is zero,
i.e. it is not optimal to invest in renewable power. Annual household expenditures
on durable goods, such as cars or housing, are another example.
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When the dependent variable is continuous but bounded from above or below,
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation leads to slope coefficient estimates that are
biased toward zero, since variation in the regressors is not fully captured by variation
in the dependent variable due to the constraints imposed by censoring.1 The Tobit
model was developed by James Tobin to deal with this type of nonlinearity [71].
It is important to note that the coefficient estimates in the Tobit model rep-
resent the marginal effect of an independent variable x on the unobserved latent
censored variable y∗ and thus can not be interpreted as the marginal effect of x on
the observed dependent variable y, as in the linear regression model. Rather, the
coefficients reflect the combination of (1) the change in y of those above the limit,
weighted by the probability of being above the limit, and (2) the change in the
probability of being above the limit, weighted by the expected value of y if above
[72]. The marginal effect of x on y depends on all coefficient estimates as well as on
the estimate of the disturbance standard deviation.
This study investigates the finite sample bias of severe censoring for differ-
ent sample sizes of varying T and N . The Tobit maximum likelihood estimator
assumes normality and homoskedasticity, and is inconsistent when the disturbance
is non-normal or heteroskedastic [73, 74]. Similarly, when the residuals are serially
dependent, the maximum likelihood estimator is still consistent, though inefficient
[31]. How the Tobit model behaves in finite sample with severe censoring, when any
of these assumptions is violated, is worth asking but beyond the scope of this paper.
1In fact, the bias in the OLS slope estimates can be corrected by dividing OLS slopes by the
proportion of nonlimit observations in the sample [70].
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4.3 Experimental Setup of the Monte Carlo Study
Consider the latent model
y∗it = c+ βxit + δdit + αi + εit (4.1)






0 if y∗it ≤ 0.
The sample log likelihood for i = 1, . . . , N individuals over t = 1, . . . , T time
periods is given by equation 4.2. The function λ(·), known as the inverse Mills ratio,
























The data of N individuals over T time periods are generated according to the
following specifications, which are based on [68].
1. xit ∼ N(0, 1) is a continuous variable.
2. dit = 1[eit > 0] where eit ∼ N(0, 1) is an indicator variable.
3. εit ∼ N(0, σ) is the error term, and the variance σ = 1.
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4. αi = 0.3ui where ui ∼ N(0, 1) is the individual effect.
5. The coefficients are set as β = 1 and δ = 1.
6. Varying the constant c ∈ {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0} changes the percentage of un-
censored observations from 1 to 63.
7. The latent variable is generated as y∗it = c + βxit + δdit + αi + εit. For cross-
sectional data with T = 1, the latent variable is y∗i = c+ βxi + δdi + εi.
8. The observed censored variable is yit = max{0, y∗it} and yi = max{0, y∗i } in the
cross-sectional case.
The x variable is generated at the beginning of the study and remains fixed
throughout. In each of the 1000 replications, error terms are (re-)generated and
a random-effects Tobit model is estimated using the statistical software package
STATA. The Monte Carlo study is strictly replicable.2
As in [68], the results of the Monte Carlo experiments are presented as the
average of 1000 replications of the estimated bias in the estimates, measured against
the true values. The bias is reported in percent. The true values of β = δ = σ = 1
are known, but the true parameter values of the marginal effects and the standard
errors do not exist and are estimated with the data.
The standard error of β and δ, averaged over all replications, is compared
with the “true” standard error, which is taken as the standard deviation of the
distribution of the estimated β and δ over all replications.
2The code for the Monte Carlo study as well as the seed for the random number generator are
available from the author upon request.
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4.3.1 Marginal Effects
Three types of marginal effects are considered: The marginal effect of x or d
on the latent dependent variable y∗ (1), the marginal effect of x or d on the expected
censored variable y conditional on y > 0 (2) and unconditional on y (3). They are
derived, respectively, from the three conditional mean functions given by equations
4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
Which type of marginal effect is of interest for a particular study depends on
the context. In the corner solution model, the marginal effect of the independent
variables on the latent variable y∗ will usually be uninteresting, since censoring is
a byproduct of the maximization problem rather than due to data observability
issues. When the dependent variable is censored in the traditional sense due to
observability, the marginal effect of the independent variables on y∗ could be of
primary interest. As any of the three types of marginal effects can be of interest
depending on the research question, this paper reports percentage bias for all three
types.
E [y∗it|xit, dit, αi] = c+ αi + βxit + δdit (4.3)
E [yit|xit, dit, αi] = (c+ αi + βxit + δdit) · Φ
(




+ σ · φ(c+ αi + βxit + δdit) (4.4)
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E [yit|xit, dit, αi, yit > 0] = c+ αi + βxit + δdit + σλ
(




The marginal effects of x and d on the latent unobserved variable y∗ are derived
from equation 4.3. They are simply equal to the corresponding coefficients, similar
to the standard linear regression model, and are given by equations 4.6 and 4.7. The
true value of these marginal effects is known, since β = δ = 1.
∂E [y∗it|αi, xit, dit]
∂xit
= β (4.6)
∂E [y∗it|αi, xit, dit]
∂dit
= δ (4.7)
The unconditional marginal effects MEx(y) and MEd(y), derived from equa-
tion 4.4, are given by equations 4.8 and 4.9.
MEx ≡
∂E [yit|αi, xit, dit]
∂xit
= β · Φ
(




MEd ≡ E [yit|αi, xit, dit = 1]− E [yit|αi, xit, dit = 0] =



























The conditional marginal effects MEx(y > 0) and MEd(y > 0) are derived
from equation 4.5 and are given by equations 4.10 and 4.11.
MEx(y > 0) ≡







c+ αi + βxit + δdit
σ
)[








MEd(y > 0) ≡ E [yit|αi, xit, dit = 1, yit > 0]− E [yit|αi, xit, dit = 0, yit > 0] =













The estimated and “true” marginal effects of x and d on the observed censored
dependent variable are calculated as the average marginal effect at each N×T data-
point rather than once at the data means. The estimated version uses the estimated
values of β, δ, and σ, while the “true” version uses the true values of β = δ = σ = 1
and also includes the true individual effects αi. These data-point-average marginal
effects are then averaged again over all the replications to produce the final values,
upon which the percentage bias calculations are based.
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4.4 Results
Table 4.1 demonstrates the effect of censoring on Tobit estimates for varying
N for the cross-sectional case with T = 1. For 63, 37, and 16 percent uncensored
observations, the percent bias in the Tobit estimates of the coefficients, standard
errors, marginal effects, and the variance remains below 1 percent and only occa-
sionally reaches 5 percent. As the degree of censoring increases such that only 5
and 1 percent of the observations are uncensored, bias appears in the estimates of
the marginal effects on the observed censored variable y (though not on y∗, these
marginal effects are the coefficients, which are largely unbiased). When 5 percent of
the observations are uncensored, the Tobit model performs well only for N ≥ 3000.
Under severe censoring (1 percent uncensored observations), the Tobit model does
not perform well in finite sample with N ≤ 5000, since the marginal effects are bi-
ased up to 150 percent. With N ≥ 4000, the bias of the marginal effects conditional
on y > 0 drops below 10 percent, but estimates of the marginal effects unconditional
on y remain biased upwards of 37 percent. Thus, for T = 1 under severe censoring,
estimates of the marginal effects on the observed censored dependent variable should
be treated with caution.
Table 4.2 shows the effect of censoring on Tobit estimates for varying N and
fixed T = 2. In a small sample of N = 1000, the Tobit model performs quite well
even up to 5 percent uncensored observations. Estimates of the coefficients, standard
errors, marginal effects, and the variance are biased by only 0 to 5 percent. However,
at 1.1 percent uncensored observations the percentage bias of the estimates is large,
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particularly for the indicator variable. The marginal effects unconditional on y are
biased upwards by 768 percent, and the standard error is inflated by a factor of 19.
The estimated coefficient of the continuous variable is unbiased, but the bias shows
up in the marginal effects, which are inflated by 218 and 121 percent.
For T = 2, the estimates do not consistently improve with increased N and
decreased censoring, though there is a general tendency. The bias in the marginal
effects unconditional on y is reduced to around 16 percent for N = 5000 and c = −4.
The bias in the marginal effects conditional on y > 0 is even lower, at 9 percent for
the continuous variable and 1 percent for the indicator variable. The standard error
of δ, which is inflated for N = 1000 and c = −4, is initially reduced with increasing
N but then turns increasingly negative, thereby underestimating the true standard
error.
In general for T = 2, under severe censoring with only 1.1 percent uncensored
observations, the marginal effects are biased upwards and the standard errors are
biased as well, though the direction of the bias depends on N . For small N , the
standard error of the indicator variable is overestimated, but in all other cases the
standard errors are underestimated. Attenuation in the estimates of the standard
errors could lead to faulty inference about variable significance due to inflated Wald
test statistics.
Table 4.3 presents the Monte Carlo results for T = 3, varying N , and varying
degrees of censoring. Again, the Tobit model performs quite well for up to 5 percent
uncensored observations (c = −3), though with some attenuation in the standard
error estimate of the indicator variable at 16 percent uncensored observations. Most
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of the bias for the severe censoring case appears as an overestimation of the marginal
effects unconditional on y and an underestimation of the standard errors. A positive
result is that the estimated marginal effects conditional on y > 0 are unbiased for
T = 3 and N ≥ 2000.
For T = 5 and T = 8, only the results for the severe censoring case are reported
in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively, since the Tobit estimates for uncensored obser-
vations of 5 percent or more are effectively unbiased. For T = 5 and N ≤ 2000, the
standard errors are underestimated and the marginal effects are overestimated for
both the continuous and binary dependent variables. For N ≥ 3000, the estimates
are largely unbiased. Similarly, for T = 8 and N ≥ 2000, the bias in the estimates
of the marginal effects in the severe censoring case remains below 12 percent.
A caveat for the interpretation of these results relates to the number of repli-
cations. Particularly in the case of severe censoring (c = −4), convergence in the
numerical computation of the maximum likelihood could not be achieved after 30
iterations in some of the 1000 replications. Table 4.6 reports the percentage of repli-
cations, which produced no results due to non-convergence. The analysis above is
based on those replications, in which convergence was achieved. For example in the
worst case encountered here with T = 8, c = −4, and N = 5000, about 50 percent
of the replications produced no results. The estimates reported for this case are
thus based on only 500 replications.
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4.5 Conclusions
This paper is the result of an econometric problem encountered in determining
the drivers of wind power in the United States [45]. Optimal investment in wind
power for a particular county in a particular year is usually zero - the corner solution
to an optimization problem. It was unclear a priori how the Tobit model would
handle censoring of the dependent variable exceeding 98 percent in finite sample. A
review of the literature provided an unsatisfactory answer to this question, which
prompted the research in this paper.
Overall, the Tobit model performs well in finite sample with even up to 5
percent uncensored observations for all combinations of T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 8} and N ∈
{1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000} considered. Under severe censoring with 1 percent
uncensored observations, the percentage bias can be large, in particular for the
standard errors and marginal effects on the observed censored dependent variable.
For the case of severe censoring (1 percent uncensored observations), the fol-
lowing results hold. For researchers interested in the marginal effect of the inde-
pendent variables on the unobserved latent dependent variable y∗, the Tobit model
provides reasonably unbiased coefficient estimates for T = 1 and N ≥ 2000, T = 2
and N ≥ 3000 (with attenuated standard errors), T = 3 and N ≥ 2000 (with at-
tenuated standard errors), T = 5 and N ≥ 1000 (with attenuated standard errors),
and T = 8 and N ≥ 2000. In general, the estimates of coefficients and standard
errors are largely unbiased for any T and N ≥ 3000 for the case of severe censoring.
For researchers interested in the marginal effect of the independent variables
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on the observed censored variable y, unconditional on y, the Tobit model provides
reasonably unbiased estimates of this type of marginal effect in the case of severe
censoring (1 percent uncensored observations) for T = 5 and N ≥ 3000, and T = 8
and N ≥ 2000. The estimates of this marginal effect are biased for T = 1, 2, and 3.
If the marginal effect of the independent variables on the observed censored
variable y, conditional on y > 0, is of interest, the Tobit model provides reasonably
unbiased estimates of this type of marginal effect in the severe censoring case (1
percent uncensored observations) for T = 1 and N ≥ 4000, T = 2 and N ≥ 5000,
T = 3 and N ≥ 2000, T = 5 and N ≥ 3000, and T = 8 and N ≥ 2000.
The Monte Carlo results presented here for combinations of T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 8}
and N ∈ {1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000} should be of use to applied economists facing
severely censored data. For those combinations of T and N that do produce biased
estimates, the direction of the bias can be useful to provide upper or lower bounds
on estimates.
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Table 4.1: Effect of Censoring on Tobit Estimates for T = 1 (Percent Bias)
c = 0 c = −1 c = −2 c = −3 c = −4
Uncensored (%) 63 37 16 4.9 1.0
N = 1000 β 0.217 0.118 0.37 0.294 2.3
SE(β) 0.696 -0.642 0.0615 -1.54 -2.52
MEx 0.218 0.232 1.38 12.4 150
MEx(y > 0) 0.567 0.683 1.69 4.89 29.6
δ 0.173 0.281 0.457 1.83 -14
SE(δ) -4.51 -1.63 -0.79 -5.02 15.4
MEd 0.314 0.564 1.79 20.2 97.5
MEd(y > 0) 0.394 0.623 1.13 4.1 -7.22
σ -0.212 -0.379 -0.644 -2.04 -6.67
N = 2000 β 0.0589 0.192 0.185 -0.144 -0.874
SE(β) -1.31 -4.77 -2.77 -1.32 -1.62
MEx 0.0795 0.363 0.648 5.53 81.8
MEx(y > 0) 0.216 0.458 0.901 2.27 10.4
δ 0.158 0.395 0.206 0.992 -0.509
SE(δ) 0.965 0.119 5.07 -2.63 7.87
MEd 0.251 0.63 0.815 10.4 75.4
MEd(y > 0) 0.293 0.659 0.463 1.96 4.79
σ -0.161 -0.167 -0.36 -1.15 -3.71
N = 3000 β 0.161 0.19 0.135 0.122 0.549
SE(β) -0.772 -1 -2.8 -4.52 0.454
MEx 0.15 0.308 0.386 4.81 80.2
MEx(y > 0) 0.31 0.311 0.579 1.39 5.76
δ 0.0646 0.198 -0.0341 0.463 4.91
SE(δ) -2.79 -2.42 -0.905 -2.79 -2.47
MEd 0.109 0.363 0.377 7.01 72.5
MEd(y > 0) 0.132 0.377 0.155 1.43 12.6
σ -0.0283 0.00603 -0.174 -0.482 -1.69
N = 4000 β -0.00631 -0.066 -0.0352 -0.109 0.0247
SE(β) -0.0759 4.03 -0.747 -0.22 -3.81
MEx 0.00106 -0.125 -0.056 1.96 54.1
MEx(y > 0) 0.0691 0.131 0.355 1.08 4.1
δ 0.0277 -0.0892 -0.145 -0.231 2.2
SE(δ) 4.61 2.16 -1.15 -1.82 -0.589
MEd 0.0645 -0.0962 0.0582 3.66 45.3
MEd(y > 0) 0.0852 -0.079 -0.109 0.046 6.65
σ -0.0997 -0.162 -0.179 -0.475 -1.34
N = 5000 β 0.0534 0.138 0.149 0.14 0.863
SE(β) 0.137 0.471 1.25 1.36 0.469
MEx 0.0752 0.198 0.535 2.72 48.3
MEx(y > 0) 0.145 0.321 0.348 0.75 3.45
δ 0.127 0.136 0.25 0.177 3.21
SE(δ) -1.48 -0.183 -2.6 0.649 -3.65
MEd 0.185 0.209 0.671 3.47 36.6
MEd(y > 0) 0.213 0.247 0.475 0.741 8.02
σ -0.124 -0.123 -0.0852 -0.186 -0.776
Shaded cells indicate bias in excess of 10 percent.94
Table 4.2: Effect of Censoring on Tobit Estimates for T = 2 (Percent Bias)
c = 0 c = −1 c = −2 c = −3 c = −4
Uncensored (%) 63 37 16 5.1 1.1
N = 1000 β 0.0971 0.146 0.169 0.0301 0.171
SE(β) 1.85 1.9 1.62 0.176 -13.1
MEx 0.469 -0.425 -2.15 -2.49 218
MEx(y > 0) 0.241 0.39 0.942 5.63 121
δ 0.0868 0.197 0.269 0.9 21.5
SE(δ) 3.14 4.24 4.58 -4.47 1930
MEd 0.567 -0.389 -2.19 1.84 768
MEd(y > 0) -0.0378 -0.552 -0.811 -0.814 110
σ -0.0143 -0.0443 -0.209 -2.28 -10.5
N = 2000 β 0.0207 -0.00902 0.0771 0.33 -0.259
SE(β) 1.64 0.63 -3.15 -0.603 -10.9
MEx 0.404 -0.693 -2.66 -4.42 37.5
MEx(y > 0) 0.155 0.289 0.657 3.66 41.6
δ 0.033 -0.0625 -0.0172 0.348 3.3
SE(δ) -0.365 4.63 -0.865 -2.97 77.2
MEd 0.502 -0.792 -3.02 -3.2 66.3
MEd(y > 0) -0.0825 -0.985 -1.38 -1.52 13.4
σ -0.165 -0.196 -0.205 -1.45 -5.62
N = 3000 β 0.0858 0.115 0.158 -0.0201 0.401
SE(β) -0.793 -3.28 0.821 2.61 -22.7
MEx 0.511 -0.361 -2.2 -5.15 29.2
MEx(y > 0) 0.137 0.185 0.299 1.58 25.6
δ 0.264 0.326 0.35 0.473 1.76
SE(δ) -0.357 -1.07 2.23 4.51 -5.76
MEd 0.769 -0.219 -2.42 -4.38 17.2
MEd(y > 0) 0.169 -0.449 -0.811 -1.05 4.35
σ -0.026 -0.0259 0.0122 -0.638 -2.82
N = 4000 β 0.0485 0.0938 -0.0344 0.0197 -0.332
SE(β) 0.301 0.0685 1.68 0.96 -11.9
MEx 0.451 -0.511 -2.93 -5.28 6.27
MEx(y > 0) 0.113 0.208 0.263 1.48 12.8
δ 0.0508 0.032 -0.0689 0.425 0.387
SE(δ) -0.643 -1.07 -1.75 -2.17 -6.53
MEd 0.521 -0.648 -3.25 -4.86 7.49
MEd(y > 0) -0.0848 -0.84 -1.49 -1.08 -2.68
σ -0.0761 -0.0473 -0.116 -0.548 -3.66
N = 5000 β 0.0178 0.0739 -0.0205 0.0897 0.423
SE(β) 2.29 -0.742 0.105 0.571 -22.9
MEx 0.375 -0.589 -3.03 -5.22 15.9
MEx(y > 0) 0.0569 0.161 0.218 1.15 9.27
δ -0.127 -0.0956 -0.267 0.223 1.61
SE(δ) 1.63 1.42 -0.82 -3.01 -20
MEd 0.283 -0.834 -3.57 -5.47 16.3
MEd(y > 0) -0.342 -1.02 -1.73 -1.14 1.29
σ 0.0261 0.00454 -0.0453 -0.312 -2.45
Shaded cells indicate bias in excess of 10 percent.95
Table 4.3: Effect of Censoring on Tobit Estimates for T = 3 (Percent Bias)
c = 0 c = −1 c = −2 c = −3 c = −4
Uncensored (%) 63 37 16 5.1 1.1
N = 1000 β -0.0523 -0.0965 0.0332 0.222 3.16
SE(β) 1.73 -1.28 -3.38 -9.46 -33.2
MEx 0.342 -0.791 -3.3 -3.31 162
MEx(y > 0) -0.00388 0.133 1.45 4.05 31.9
δ 0.0883 -0.0726 -0.556 0.0856 11.1
SE(δ) -1.56 -2.22 -13.1 -8.59 488
MEd 0.57 -0.772 -3.81 -1.4 302
MEd(y > 0) -0.0353 -0.979 -2.12 -1.39 41.2
σ -0.0495 -0.149 -0.636 -1.54 -4.44
N = 2000 β 0.0873 0.128 0.193 -0.044 0.786
SE(β) 3.09 1.99 1.03 -2.8 -46.9
MEx 0.459 -0.435 -2.46 -4.85 50.5
MEx(y > 0) 0.159 0.198 0.486 0.87 9.65
δ 0.0243 0.134 -0.0657 0.0487 1.88
SE(δ) 1.56 -1.18 -6.42 -2.96 -13.2
MEd 0.468 -0.496 -3.07 -4.76 37.6
MEd(y > 0) -0.15 -0.705 -1.33 -1.1 3.13
σ 0.0216 0.0204 -0.0202 -0.246 -2.67
N = 3000 β 0.0201 0.0908 0.155 0.193 0.488
SE(β) -2.1 1.43 -8.02 -0.289 -37.2
MEx 0.406 -0.519 -3.31 -5.28 22
MEx(y > 0) 0.0712 0.178 1.22 1.27 9.26
δ 0.0199 0.032 -0.722 -0.0961 1.71
SE(δ) -2.39 -1.2 -18.3 -1.53 -14.2
MEd 0.471 -0.654 -4.43 -5.83 24.6
MEd(y > 0) -0.143 -0.852 -2.42 -1.5 0.442
σ -0.0423 -0.0145 -0.503 -0.381 -3.11
N = 4000 β -0.013 0.0412 0.0505 -0.0569 1.09
SE(β) 1.1 -0.811 -4.3 3.72 -25.8
MEx 0.35 -0.612 -3.2 -6.28 13.2
MEx(y > 0) -0.00175 0.0835 0.638 0.519 5.68
δ -0.0706 -0.0931 -0.548 -0.358 1.25
SE(δ) 3.21 1.71 -16 0.665 -10.1
MEd 0.343 -0.817 -4.05 -6.96 6.12
MEd(y > 0) -0.278 -1.03 -2.14 -1.83 1.26
σ 0.0354 0.0337 -0.222 -0.121 -1.21
N = 5000 β -0.0273 0.0119 0.142 0.0593 0.753
SE(β) 2.22 4.16 -8.32 3.09 -46.9
MEx 0.344 -0.64 -3.04 -5.87 22.3
MEx(y > 0) -0.0188 0.0544 0.769 0.6 4.56
δ -0.0441 -0.0535 -0.482 -0.0523 1.39
SE(δ) 0.906 -0.244 -23.6 0.42 -23.7
MEd 0.378 -0.784 -3.97 -6.53 17.2
MEd(y > 0) -0.242 -0.989 -2.04 -1.45 1.96
σ 0.00026 0.00151 -0.255 -0.162 -1.23
Shaded cells indicate bias in excess of 10 percent.96
Table 4.4: Effect of Sample Size on Tobit Estimates for 1.1 Percent Uncensored
Observations and T = 5 (Percent Bias)
N=1000 N=2000 N=3000 N=4000 N=5000
β 3.73 2.82 -0.316 0.136 0.046
SE(β) -75.8 -78.8 0.553 -14.5 1.6
MEx 204 121 -4.25 -2.77 -6.3
MEx(y > 0) 8.72 3.86 2.53 2.8 1.99
δ 3.99 2.3 0.431 0.958 0.321
SE(δ) -44.1 -59.3 1.98 -6.01 -2.19
MEd 200 104 -4.01 -2.01 -7.04
MEd(y > 0) 24.2 13.4 -1.08 -0.471 -1.05
σ -0.111 0.946 -1.14 -1.15 -0.788
Shaded cells indicate bias in excess of 10 percent.
Table 4.5: Effect of Sample Size on Tobit Estimates for 1.1 Percent Uncensored
Observations and T = 8 (Percent Bias)
N=1000 N=2000 N=3000 N=4000 N=5000
β 12.2 0.366 -0.238 0.126 0.0636
SE(β) -92.1 -3.34 -2.99 0.963 1.7
MEx 597 0.844 -5.72 -5.62 -7.02
MEx(y > 0) 6.07 1.62 1.07 0.823 0.272
δ 11.4 0.573 0.425 0.504 0.182
SE(δ) -85 -4.73 -4.15 -2.96 7.74
MEd 459 -5.93 -7.28 -8.84 -11.7
MEd(y > 0) 69.1 0.474 -0.546 -0.217 -0.469
σ 8.48 -0.278 -0.493 -0.199 0.0949
Shaded cells indicate bias in excess of 10 percent.
Table 4.6: Missing Results Due to Non-Convergence (Percent of Replications)
Censoring N = 1000 N = 2000 N = 3000 N = 4000 N = 5000
T = 1 c = −4 32.4 8.9 2.2 0.4 0.1
T = 2 c = −3 0.1 0 0 0 0.1
c = −4 4.1 4.6 7.4 9.5 13.6
T = 3 c = −4 2.3 6.0 14.7 18.6 23.1
T = 5 c = −4 4.8 13.8 22.3 28.3 36.1
T = 8 c = −4 13.6 24.3 35.8 49.0 50.6
The values above show the percentage of replications, in which convergence for the nu-
merical computation of the maximum likelihood was not achieved after 30 iterations due
to discontinuous regions or non-concavity. Combinations of T , c, and N , which are not
shown above, have zero missing results. For example in the case of T = 1, c = −4, and
N = 1000, the Tobit results presented in this paper are based on the 676 out of 1000




Transitioning to a cleaner electricity generation mix is an important step to-
wards mitigating climate change. While some form of government intervention is
necessary to remove the externality associated with emissions in the power sector,
it is important that policies be both effective and cost-effective. For example, subsi-
dies for renewable power could lead to a situation where the clustering of renewable
power plants results in curtailment, thereby negating cost-effectiveness. In addition,
if the output from these renewable power plants substitutes for output from a hy-
dropower plant rather than a conventional plant, then the policy is ineffective, since
the overall goal of reducing emissions in the power sector has not been achieved.
Policy design is therefore crucial to mitigating climate change efficiently.
This dissertation inquires into several aspects of renewable energy policy.
Chapter 2 provides an empirical analysis of the drivers of wind power development in
the United States and presents estimates of the cost-effectiveness of various policies.
Chapter 3 offers a more detailed discussion of policy design. It finds that reductions
in both electricity transmission congestion and system-wide emissions levels can be
achieved by revising renewable energy policies to take into account their effect on
plant location. Finally, Chapter 4 deals with an econometric issue, severe censoring
in the Tobit model, that arises from the empirical analysis in Chapter 2.
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The federal production tax credit and the state-level corporate tax credit, sales
tax incentive, and production incentives emerge as significant drivers of wind power
development, of which the production incentive ranks as the most cost-effective.
Next to these direct subsidies for renewable power, access to the electricity grid is
another important factor for wind power development. Higher wind power penetra-
tion levels can be achieved cost-effectively by bringing more parts of the electricity
transmission grid under the control of Regional Transmission Organizations, which
introduce competitive wholesale markets for electricity and provide supply schedul-
ing closer to real time than in grids regulated by local utilities. Expanding the
grid to include more remote windy areas is the most expensive way to encourage
the development of wind power. This step may be necessary to achieve large-scale
emissions reductions in the power sector. The main conclusion is that state and
federal government policies play a significant role in wind power development both
by providing financial support and by improving access to the electricity grid.
The effect of renewable power plant location on electricity transmission conges-
tion and system-wide emissions levels is examined in a model and simulation study
in Chapter 3. Without a price on congestion, there is no signal to prevent the devel-
opment of areas with high concentrations of renewable power plants that then suffer
from transmission congestion resulting in curtailment of renewable power. Similarly,
the lack of a price on emissions means that investment in renewable power is not
directed towards locations with large abatement potential. Only the combination
of a national price on carbon and a congestion charge can ensure optimal use of
existing transmission infrastructure to achieve optimal reductions in emissions.
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Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes how the Tobit model performs in finite sample
for differing degrees of censoring. Overall, the Tobit model performs well in finite
sample with even up to 5 percent uncensored observations for all combinations of
T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 8} and N ∈ {1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000} considered. Under severe
censoring with 1 percent uncensored observations, the percentage bias can be large,
in particular for the standard errors and marginal effects on the observed censored
dependent variable. The estimates of coefficients and standard errors are largely
unbiased for all T considered and N ≥ 3000. Estimates of the marginal effect of
the independent variables on the observed censored variable y, unconditional on y,
are unbiased for T = 5 and N ≥ 3000, and T = 8 and N ≥ 2000. Estimates of
these marginal effects conditional on y > 0 are unbiased for T = 1 and N ≥ 4000,
T = 2 and N ≥ 5000, T = 3 and N ≥ 2000, T = 5 and N ≥ 3000, and T = 8 and
N ≥ 2000.
This dissertation contributes to the discussion of renewable energy policy by
analyzing the performance of various policies in supporting wind power and high-
lighting the effect of renewable power plant location on transmission congestion and
emissions levels. Understanding how renewable power plants affect and are affected
by congestion and how the congestion and emissions externalities interact is vital
to mitigating climate change in an efficient manner. As the portion of electricity









Figure A.2: United States Map of Wind Plants and Wind Power Class
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics: 1998-2007
Top row: Zero Investment Varies Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Bottom row: Positive investment Over+
Log capacity additions (MW) CT 0*** 0 0 0
1.15 1.84 0 6.47
Wind power class C 1.91*** 0.93** 1 4.9
2.54 0.98 1.02 5
Corporate tax credit (0/1) ST 0.16*** 0.367*** 0 1
0.373 0.484 0 1
Sales tax credit ST 0.875*** 2.04*** 0 6.5
(sales tax rate in %) 1.87 2.75 0 6.5
Property tax credit ST 0.42*** 0.478 0 1
(% reduction of assessed value) 0.646 0.46 0 1
Production incentive (¢/kWh) CT 0.179*** 0.588*** 0 3
0.36 0.699 0 3
Linearized renewable portfolio CT 10.8*** 45.4*** 0 305
standard (%) 30.7 77.9 0 305
PTC expiration year (0/1) T 0.302*** 0.459*** 0 1
0.219 0.414 0 1
Transmission line length C 0.142 0.153*** 0 1.27
(miles/square mile area) 0.154 0.216 0 1.22
RTO regulated grid (0/1) CT 0.429*** 0.495* 0 1
0.675 0.469 0 1
Electricity price (retail, ¢/kWh) ST 6.86*** 1.85*** 4 21.3
7.66 2.45 4.3 21.3
Income per capita (millions) CT 2.4*** 6.91*** 0.00385 140
4.23 13.1 0.0128 131
Population density CT 114 245 0.1 2070
(population/square mile) 101 255 0.7 2040
Distance to nearest city (miles) C 16.7** 13.3*** 0 63.3
15.6 11.7 0 47.7
Agricultural sales/farm C 106*** 134*** 0 1790
(thousands, 1997) 171 186 5.96 1240
County area (square miles) C 1140*** 1520*** 24.8 20100
1550 1740 288 8160
+ Variables vary across states (S), counties (C), or over time (T).
Over the 1998-2007 period, there are 20,908 observations with zero installed capacity
(top row) and 612 observations with positive installed capacity (bottom row). In 2007,
wind power plants were installed in 122 of 2,152 counties.
Differences in means and standard deviations may be significant at the 1% (***), 5%
(**), or 10% (*) level. The difference in means is tested with a t-test allowing for unequal












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.1: Mean Transmission Line Coverage and Emissions by Fuel Source in PJM
Fuel Line Emission (lbs/h) Annual CO2eq Year Obs.
coverage PM SO2 emission (tons)
Coal 0.54 153.02 406.94 4,699,991 1973 90
Oil & Other 0.47 47.82 62.55 562,389 1974 79
Natural Gas 0.53 9.81 7.96 189,962 1994 113
Waste 0.44 85.25 17.33 7,800 1991 31
Nuclear 0.43 0 0 122 1979 17
Hydro 0.78 0 0 0 1952 37
Wind 0.20 0 0 0 2005 12
B.1 Proofs
The capacities of the wind plants installed by the social planner taking into ac-
count transmission congestion are less than or equal to those installed by individual
profit-maximizing firms. In general, ksi ≤ k∗i for all i.
Proof. Suppose the contrary were true and ksi > k
∗
i for all i even though all lo-
cations cause congestion externalities, i.e.
∑
j 6=i(∂fi/∂kj) · kj < 0 for all i. Since
∂fi/∂ki ≤ 0 and ∂fi/∂kj ≤ 0, it follows that fi(ks1, . . . , ksn) ≤ fi(k∗1, . . . , k∗n) ≤
1. With ∂2fi/∂k
2
i ≤ 0 and ∂2fi/∂ki∂kj ≤ 0, it follows that
∂fi
∂ki





(k∗1, . . . , k
∗
n) ≤ 0. This means the first two terms of equation 3.1 are less than or
equal to the first two terms of equation 3.2. The third term of the equation 3.2 is
strictly less than zero. It follows that equation 3.2 is strictly less than equation 3.1.
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However, both equations are equal to zero, which is a contradiction. It follows that
ksi ≤ k∗i for all i. 
A capacity-based subsidy offered in Region A contributes to clustering of wind
plants. Comparing equations 3.4 and 3.1, it follows that kri > k
∗
i for all i ∈ IA and
krj = k
∗
j for all j /∈ IA.
Proof. Suppose the contrary were true and kri < k
∗
i for all i even though ri > 0 for i ∈
IA. With ∂fi/∂ki ≤ 0 and ∂fi/∂kj ≤ 0, it follows that fi(k∗1, . . . , k∗n) ≤ fi(kr1, . . . , krn).
Since ∂2fi/∂k
2
i ≤ 0 and ∂2fi/∂ki∂kj ≤ 0, it follows that
∂fi
∂ki





(kr1, . . . , k
r
n) ≤
0. Finally, ri − c ≥ c. Thus, the first two terms of equation 3.4 are greater or equal
to the first two terms of equation 3.1. For i ∈ IA, the third term of equation 3.4,
ri−c, is strictly greater than the third term of equation 3.1. This is a contradiction,
since both equations are equal to zero for all i. Thus, kri ≥ k∗i for all i. 
B.2 Optimal Power Flow
The objective function of the optimal power flow problem is the summation of
individual quadratic cost functions f iP and f
i
Q of real and reactive power injections,












subject to equality constraints, inequality constraints, and variable limits, where Θ
and Vm are the nb × 1 vectors of voltage angles and magnitudes, and Pg and Qg
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are the ng × 1 vectors of generator real and reactive power injections. In the case
of the IEEE 30 bus test system, the number of buses nb is 30, and the number of
generators ng is 6, and the number of branch lines nl is 41.
The equality constraints are the full set of 2 × nb nonlinear real and reactive
power balance equations, such that supply in real and reactive power equals demand
at each bus.
Pb(Θ, Vm) + Pd = CgPg (B.1)
Qb(Θ, Vm) +Qd = CgQg (B.2)
The sparse nb × ng generator connection matrix Cg is defined such that its (i, j)th
element is 1 if generator j is located at bus i and 0 otherwise.
The inequality constraints consist of two sets of nl branch flow limits, one for
the from end and one for the to branch:
|Ff (Θ, Vm)| ≤ Fmax (B.3)
|Ft(Θ, Vm)| ≤ Fmax (B.4)
The flows F (Θ, Vm) can be flows of apparent power S(Θ, Vm) in MVA, real power
P (Θ, Vm) in MW, or current I(Θ, Vm) in A. When all branch flow constraints are
slack, the system is uncongested.
The variable limits include an equality constraint on any reference bus angle
and upper and lower limits on all bus voltage magnitudes and real and reactive
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power injections:
θrefi ≤ θi ≤ θrefi , i ∈ Iref (B.5)
νi,minm ≤ νim ≤ νi,maxm , i = 1, . . . , nb (B.6)
pi,ming ≤ pig ≤ pi,maxg , i = 1, . . . , ng (B.7)
qi,ming ≤ qig ≤ qi,maxg , i = 1, . . . , ng (B.8)
B.3 Modified IEEE 30 Bus Test System Data
Table B.2: Bus Data
Bus Load (MW) Bus Load (MW)
Real Reactive Real Reactive
1 0 0 16 3.5 1.8
2 21.7 12.7 17 9 5.8
3 2.4 1.2 18 3.2 0.9
4 7.6 1.6 19 9.5 3.4
5 94.2 0 20 2.2 0.7
6 0 0 21 17.5 11.2
7 22.8 10.9 22 0 0
8 30 30 23 3.2 1.6
9 0 0 24 8.7 6.7
10 5.8 2 25 0 0
11 0 0 26 3.5 2.3
12 11.2 7.5 27 0 0
13 0 0 28 0 0
14 6.2 1.6 29 2.4 0.9
15 8.2 2.5 30 10.6 1.9
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Table B.3: Generator Data
Area Bus Cost coefficients Power output (MW)
c0 c1 c2 Pmin Pmax
A
1 0 2 0.02 0 80
2 0 1.75 0.0175 0 80
B
13 0 3 0.025 0 40
23 0 3 0.025 0 30
C
22 0 1 0.0625 0 50
27 0 3.25 0834 0 55
Note: Operating costs for each of the i = 1, . . . , 6 generators are given by the









Table B.4: Branch Data
From bus To bus Resistance Reactance Total line charging
susceptance
1 2 0.0192 0.0575 0.0528
1 3 0.0452 0.1652 0.0408
2 4 0.057 0.1737 0.0368
3 4 0.0132 0.0379 084
2 5 0.0472 0.1983 0.0418
2 6 0.0581 0.1763 0.0374
4 6 0.0119 0.0414 09
5 7 0.046 0.116 0.0204
6 7 0.0267 0.082 0.017
6 8 0.012 0.042 09
6 9 0 0.208 0
6 10 0 0.556 0
9 11 0 0.208 0
9 10 0 0.11 0
4 12 0 0.256 0
12 13 0 0.14 0
12 14 0.1231 0.2559 0
12 15 0.0662 0.1304 0
12 16 0.0945 0.1987 0
14 15 0.221 0.1997 0
16 17 0.0524 0.1923 0
15 18 0.1073 0.2185 0
18 19 0.0639 0.1292 0
19 20 0.034 0.068 0
10 20 0.0936 0.209 0
10 17 0.0324 0.0845 0
10 21 0.0348 0.0749 0
10 22 0.0727 0.1499 0
21 22 0.0116 0.0236 0
15 23 0.1 0.202 0
22 24 0.115 0.179 0
23 24 0.132 0.27 0
24 25 0.1885 0.3292 0
25 26 0.2544 0.38 0
25 27 0.1093 0.2087 0
28 27 0 0.396 0
27 29 0.2198 0.4153 0
27 30 0.3202 0.6027 0
29 30 0.2399 0.4533 0
8 28 0.0636 0.2 0.0428
6 28 0.0169 0.0599 0.013
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